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The Virtues of Private Securities Litigation: An
Historic and Macroeconomic Perspective
Steven A. Ramirez*
In the wake of the Great Depression, the federal securities laws
operated to mandate disclosure of material facts to investors and extend
broad private remedies to victims of securities fraudfeasors. The
revelation of massive securities fraud underlying the Great Depression
animated the federal securities laws as investment plunged after 1929
and failed to recover for years. For over sixty years after the enactment
of the federal securities laws, no episode of massive securities fraud
with significant macroeconomic harm occurred. The federal securities
laws thereby operated to facilitate financial stability and prosperity, in
addition to a superior allocation of capital. Unfortunately, as memories
faded and inequality soared, corporate and financial elites (with the
active aid of lawmakers) launched a sustained attack upon private
enforcement of the securities laws. Soon thereafter the horrors of the
Great Depression returned and massive securities fraud triggered the
Great Recession of 2008 as economists predicted. This Article argues
for a rollback of the war on private securities litigation to at least the
1980s based upon history and economic science. This would at least
restore sensible pleading standards, impose liability on all participants
in securities frauds (including aiders and abettors) and allow the states
to impose more demanding standards of liability on wrongdoers in
financial markets.
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INTRODUCTION
Although securities fraud certainly inheres to modern financial
markets, recent bouts of pervasive and systemic securities fraud seem
unprecedented.1 Indeed, compared to an extended golden era of
financial stability2 that lasted over six decades since the enactment of
the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”)3 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”),4 the American financial
system today operates with less transparency and more fraud than ever
before.5 This Article seeks to demonstrate that the U.S. suffers from a
1. For example, according to Massachusetts Institute of Technology Professor Andrew Lo the
recent mega-scandal surrounding the manipulation of LIBOR, a key benchmark interest rate for
trillions in securities and financial instruments, “dwarfs by orders of magnitude any financial
scams in the history of markets.” James O’Toole, Explaining the Libor Interest Rate Mess,
CNNMONEY (July 10, 2010, 12:07 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/07/03/investing/liborinterest-rate-faq/index.htm.
2. I refer to the period beginning with the end of the Great Depression and ending with the
Great Financial Crisis of 2008 (as defined in Part III). These two events mark the last two
instances of a financial crisis triggering a major macroeconomic contraction in the U.S. In fact,
between these two events experts can identify no other financial crisis of similar magnitude. See
Greg Robb, Bernanke: This may be Worse than Great Depression, MARKETWATCH (July 26,
2009, 10:21 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/bernanke-explains-crisis-to-average-amer
icans-2009-07-26?siteid=rss&rss=1 (‘“A lot of things happened, a lot came together, [and]
created probably the worst financial crisis, certainly since the Great Depression and possibly even
including the Great Depression.”‘ (alteration in original) (quoting Federal Reserve Chairman Ben
Bernanke)); see also Vivian Lou Chen, Greenspan Says Lehman Unleashed ‘Most Virulent’
Crisis, BLOOMBERG (May 7, 2010, 1:07 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-0507/greenspan-says-lehman-failure-unleashed-most-virulent-crisis-in-history.html
(‘“The
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 precipitated what, in retrospect, is likely to be
judged the most virulent global financial crisis ever.”‘ (quoting former Federal Reserve Chairman
Alan Greenspan)). As will be shown, each of these monumental events transpired upon a
foundation of massive securities fraud.
3. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
77a–77zz).
4. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp).
5. E.g., Paul Krugman, America the Tarnished, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2009, at A29
(bemoaning the lack of corporate transparency in causing the Great Financial Crisis of 2008 and
suggesting that the American economy rested too much on fraud); Paul Krugman, Enron’s
Second Coming, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2007, at A25 (stating that borrowers, mortgage investors and
mortgage bank shareholders were misled about risky mortgages while senior managers hauled in
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more corrupt financial sector, a more rigged financial marketplace and a
more fraud-ridden business environment than at any time since the
Great Depression.6
Securities fraud plays a central role in this reality and naturally arose
from a failure of law to impose rational incentives and disincentives in
the securities market.7 Private securities litigation, in particular,
suffered a series of irrational deviations from a pre-existing norm of
broad remedies for victims of securities fraud at the hands of Congress 8
and the judiciary beginning in the 1990s.9 These irrational deviations
defy explanation on any basis other than the operation of raw economic
and political power.10
Massive securities fraud (and its close

millions).
6. At the incipiency of the crisis, it was abundantly clear that investors in public firms did not
receive adequate disclosure of risks at major financial firms. According to Nobel Laureate Joseph
Stiglitz, firm Chief Executive Officers (“CEOs”) “reported high profits, gave big bonuses, big
stock options, but in fact there were huge risks buried off-balance sheet and those chickens have
now come home to roost.” Talk of the Nation: Economists Explain How to Save Capitalism,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 20, 2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php
?storyId=95906243.
7. The Great Financial Crisis of 2008 arose from numerous causes, and this Article focuses on
massive securities fraud as only one of many causes. See, e.g., STEVEN A. RAMIREZ, LAWLESS
CAPITALISM: THE SUBPRIME CRISIS AND THE CASE FOR AN ECONOMIC RULE OF LAW 1–16
(2013) (arguing that a failure of law to curb and constrain economic power productively explains
each element of the financial crisis); Melissa B. Jacoby, Home Ownership Risk Beyond a
Subprime Crisis: The Role of Delinquency Management, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2261, 2295 (2008)
(arguing that the subprime mortgage crisis shows the need for a delinquency management regime
as part of a unified housing policy); David Reiss, Subprime Standardization: How Rating
Agencies Allow Predatory Lending to Flourish in the Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 985, 1065 (2006) (arguing that rating agencies must be regulated to prevent them from
facilitating the spread of subprime mortgages and predatory loans into global financial markets);
Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage
Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 404 (2008) (arguing that conflicts, complacency and
complexity each played a significant role in the subprime crisis and that these factors can be
addressed through financial regulation on only a limited basis); Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and
the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 1 (2011) (attributing the
crisis to the deregulation of derivatives).
8. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see also Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78a).
9. Compare Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386–87 (1983) (“[W]e have
repeatedly recognized that securities laws combating fraud should be construed ‘not technically
and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate [their] remedial purposes.’” (quoting SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180 (1963)), with Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 80 (2006) (“‘[L]itigation under Rule 10b–5 presents a danger of
vexatiousness different in degree and in kind from that which accompanies litigation in general.’”
(quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975))).
10. E.g., Ann Reilly Dowd, Look Who’s Cashing in on Congress, MONEY, Dec. 1997, at 128,
132 (listing the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act as the top example of how money drives
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companion financial crises) predictably exploded thereafter.11 The law
simply failed to adequately deter fraud in the securities markets.
Part I of this Article will review the history of the federal securities
laws. Prior to the enactment of the federal securities laws, the
disclosure obligations of publicly traded firms defied any economic
logic and instead operated to assure that ordinary investors could not
possibly know the material facts regarding their investment.12 After the
Great Depression, the federal government imposed national disclosure
standards and broad private remedies that repaired the manifest
deficiencies in American capitalism.13 This secured investor confidence
and facilitated financial development and investment for over sixty
years.14 This era featured steady growth and remarkable financial
stability to such an extent that in finance and economics it is frequently

legislation).
11. Steven A. Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform in Private Securities Litigation: Dealing with
the Meritorious as Well as the Frivolous, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1080–81 (1999)
[hereinafter Arbitration and Reform] (predicting “weaker enforcement of the federal securities
laws and, therefore, less incentive for compliance” and concluding that “[d]espite its likely
effects, the PSLRA was passed with little debate of the risks of returning to a pre-Depression
regime of investors being relegated to state law remedies, or the dangers of deregulation in the
financial services industry”). Even prior to the most recent subprime frauds, scholars showed
how diluting private securities fraud remedies leads to more fraud. See Antonio E. Bernardo et
al., A Theory of Legal Presumptions, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 31–32 (2000) (modeling how a
more lax approach to securities fraud operates to increase the incidence of fraud and thus
securities litigation); Ho Young Lee & Vivek Mande, The Effect of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 on Accounting Discretion of Client Managers of Big 6 and NonBig 6 Auditors, 22 AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY 93, 93 (2003) (“We find that after the PSLRA
income-increasing discretionary accruals rise for auditees of Big 6 but not for auditees of non-Big
6 firms.”).
12. E.g., Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9
J. CORP. L. 1, 53–56 (1983) [hereinafter Seligman, Historical Need] (demonstrating that neither
state law nor stock exchanges adequately secured disclosure of material information).
13. Id. at 1–2, 9 (“[T]he failure of the critics to adequately take into account historical
evidence concerning the need for a mandatory corporate disclosure system raises serious
questions about the validity of their criticisms.”).
14. Professor Steinberg raised the possibility that the securities law had turned too far in favor
of management in early 2002: “the risk and irony of the tripartite action taken by Congress, the
courts, and the SEC [is that] [i]n seeking to enhance capital formation and alleviating the burdens
placed on business by the threat of vexatious litigation, the scales may be tipped
disproportionately against investor protection” which may make raising capital more difficult for
business. Marc I. Steinberg, Curtailing Investor Protection Under the Securities Laws: Good for
the Economy?, 55 SMU L. REV. 347, 354 (2002). Similarly, Dean Seligman argued that while
some parts of the PSLRA were defensible, “[t]here is a genuine risk that the 1995 Act will deter
both non-meritorious and meritorious litigation. . . . A more balanced approach would preserve
what is defensible in the Act, such as the lead plaintiff provision, and modulate the cruder
provisions.” Joel Seligman, Rethinking Private Securities Litigation, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 95, 117
(2004).
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termed a dynamic era of American capitalism.15 Unfortunately, the
federal judiciary as well as Congress failed to remember the success of
the federal securities laws and fell prey to the power of concentrated
economic interests that insisted that full disclosure of material facts
backed by broad private remedies was vexatious.16 By the dawn of the
twenty-first century, corporate and financial elites effectively diluted
private securities litigation through their lobbying efforts in the halls of
Congress and the federal courts.17 Massive financial crises followed.18
Part II of this Article will show the historical association of
constricted fraud remedies with financial instability. Prior to late 2001,
when Enron infamously collapsed in an orgy of securities fraud, the
federal securities laws operated to extinguish systemically and
macroeconomically significant financial crises.19 Of course the federal
securities laws did not end fraud in the securities markets. That would
be impossible. Instead the federal securities laws minimized securities
fraud to such an extent that it no longer threatened the macroeconomy.20
15. The performance of the U.S. economy since World War II has been termed
“extraordinary” with growth interrupted by only two recessions caused by oil shocks—until the
financial crisis triggered by the Enron frauds, discussed infra Part III. GEORGE KOZMETSKY &
PIYU YUE, THE ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF THE UNITED STATES 1950–2000, at 1–2
(2005). Others look globally at the age of high economic performance from 1970 to 2007. See
Martin Wolf, Risks and Rewards of the World Economy’s Golden Era, FIN. TIMES, May 1, 2007,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3b7736a4-f810-11db-baa1
000b5df10621.html?siteedition=intl#axzz2kxJVBJGd (describing period of 1970 to 2007 as a
“golden era” of steady growth and low inflation for the global economy). I use the term to refer
to the six decades of financial stability from the mid-1930s to the end of the twentieth century.
16. Professor Miller situates the deformation of private securities litigation within a greater
trend of powerful interests closing down access to the courts to the less powerful. Arthur Miller,
Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the
Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 301–05 (2013) [hereinafter Miller,
Simplified Pleading] (“[A] backlash has set in against the private enforcement of public
policies—a backlash that favors corporate and governmental interests against the claims of
individual citizens. Politicians and special interests, sometimes aided, perhaps ‘innocently,’ by
the media, vilify the plaintiffs’ bar as fee-hawking ambulance chasers.”). Professor Miller does
not limit this development just to the more political branches; he impugns the judiciary as a more
than willing participant. Id. at 304 (“[T]hese manifestations of the backlash have been given
traction by the Supreme Court, which seems to have placed a thumb on the justice scale favoring
corporate and government defendants. These manifestations have impaired both access to the
federal courts for many citizens and the enforcement of various national policies.”).
17. See Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act?, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 598, 600 (2007) (finding that the PSLRA has deterred
meritorious as well as meritless securities actions).
18. See supra notes 1, 2, 5.
19. Indeed, longtime observers routinely maintained that “U.S. securities markets are the best
securities markets in the world.” David L. Ratner, The SEC at Sixty: A Reply to Professor Macey,
16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1765, 1779 (1995); Steinberg, supra note 14, at 347.
20. Steve A. Ramirez, The Law and Macroeconomics of the New Deal at 70, 62 MD. L. REV.
515, 564 n.377 (2003) [hereinafter Ramirez, Law and Macroeconomics] (citing ROBERT J.
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After the evisceration of broad private remedies for securities fraud
macroeconomically significant financial crises reappeared.21 Once the
law tilted away from deterrence and permitted more securities fraud
under the constricted private securities remedies, fraud became
pervasive (again) throughout securities markets, culminating in the
subprime debacle.22 The financial history of the U.S. since the turn of
the century attests to the need for robust private remedies in the
securities markets.
Part III will explain, based upon the history of financial markets and
the federal securities laws, why private securities litigation operates as a
key bulwark for securing investor confidence and thus financial
stability. Private securities litigation offers powerful institutional
advantages over mere government enforcement.23
Only private
securities litigation operates free of political influence.24 Private
attorneys will not likely operate in a politically partisan manner if they
desire business success.25 Private securities litigation imposes no
material cost on the taxpayer.26 Construing private securities remedies
more broadly necessarily draws more enforcement and investigatory
resources into the policing of financial markets on the broadest basis
GORDON, MACROECONOMICS A1–A2 (9th ed. 2003)).
21. The New Deal consisted of many innovations that combined to secure financial stability
and prosperity for decades. The point of this Article is not to argue that private securities
litigation alone secured such benefits, but only to posit that it is crucial to transparency and
investor confidence in financial markets. See id.
22. Even under the current legal regime some degree of deterrence remains, even if history
shows deterrence to be inadequate. For example, a securities class action can be a catalyst for a
hostile takeover, may harm a CEO’s future prospects, lead to CEO turnover and trigger pay cuts.
Mark L. Humphery-Jenner, Internal and External Discipline Following Securities Class Actions,
21 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 151, 151 (2012). If a securities fraud action results in disclosure of
wrongdoing the firm’s stock will decline by almost 40%—hurting an executive’s stock portfolio
including options held. See Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books,
43 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 581, 582 (2008); see also Lynn Bai et al., Lying and
Getting Caught: An Empirical Study of the Effect of Securities Class Action Settlements on
Targeted Firms, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1877, 1896–1904 (2010) (finding that firms that sued in
securities class actions suffer inferior performance and a higher risk of bankruptcy).
23. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Securities Class Actions as Pragmatic ex post Regulation, 43
GA. L. REV. 63, 66 (2008) (“It is true that the securities class action is not a perfect regulator. It
is equally true, however, that its role as ex post regulation through litigation allows the United
States to maintain its attractiveness as a relatively deregulated market with relaxed ex ante
barriers and low market entry costs.”).
24. For example, Arthur Levitt, the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) during the 1990s catalogued his efforts to quell CEO power. ARTHUR LEVITT, TAKE ON
THE STREET 10–12, 106–15 (2002).
25. See Samuel Issacharoff, Regulating after the Fact, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 375, 379 (2007)
(noting that “[p]rivate enforcement is a . . . safety valve against the potential capture of the [SEC]
agency by industry”).
26. See J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
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possible—through the broad definition of securities themselves.27
Private remedies depend upon market based incentives so that only the
most meritorious and significant securities frauds warrant pursuit.28
Attorneys taking on petty and weak claims will face economic failure.
Finally, because only the most prosperous fraudfeasors will face private
suits, frivolous suits and extortive litigation pose a very low level risk
because the finest law firms in the nation will defend the most wealthy
targets of private securities litigation.29 Thus, judicial and legislative
authorities, as well as the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”), should revert to a more benign view of private securities
litigation.
This Article concludes that diluting the sanctions and risks facing
putative securities fraudfeasors in a material way creates greater
incentives for securities fraud. Pervasive securities fraud destroys
financial markets.30 This truism now has been borne out in American
financial markets.31 Both an historic and macroeconomic view of
financial markets supports this conclusion.32 As Massachusetts Institute
of Technology economist Charles Kindleberger stated: “Commercial
27. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946).
28. See Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers:
Changes During the First Decade After the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1489, 1513–14 (2006)
(finding that despite the mandated Rule 11 inquiry of the PSLRA, courts awarded sanctions in
only four cases in the first ten years of the Act’s existence).
29. See id.
30. See June Carbone, Once and Future Financial Crises: How The Hellhound of Wall Street
Sniffed Out Five Forgotten Factors Guaranteed to Produce Fiascoes, 80 UMKC L. REV. 1021,
1035–1049 (2012) (reviewing the findings of the Pecora hearings after the market crash of 1929
and finding stunning failures in disclosure of risks, risk manipulation, excessive compensation
and incentives for frauds); Enzo Incandela, Recourse Under § 10(b) on Life Support: The
Displacement of Liability and Private Securities Fraud Action after Janus v. First Derivative, 43
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 935, 935–39 (2012) (recounting investment disasters and massive
misrepresentations in the run-up to the market crash of 1929).
31. In 1929, the stock market crashed under the weight of worthless securities; in 2008, it was
bogus mortgage-backed securities. Compare H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 2 (1933) (stating that
between 1920 and 1930 about one-half of the $50 billion of new securities issued were
worthless), with Devlin Barrett & Dan Fitzpatrick, J.P. Morgan is Haunted by Decision on Loans,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 2013, at A6 (stating that a bank’s agreement to pay a $13 billion settlement
to the government for claims of mortgage-backed securities fraud occurred based upon
revelations that the bank knowingly misrepresented risks of mortgages that were “so weak they
likely would not even qualify as subprime”).
32. The need to roll back limitations on private securities litigation constitutes only one of
many maladies plaguing our financial system today. I have argued elsewhere (based upon
macroeconomic and historic evidence) that the nation’s largest banks must be fragmented, that
derivatives regulation must be imposed to reduce non-transparent risk in the financial system, that
corporate governance needs to be reformed to control CEO autonomy and that professionalization
regimes must be expanded within the financial sector, among other reforms. RAMIREZ, supra
note 7, at 47–73, 74–104.
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and financial crises are intimately bound up with transactions that
overstep the confines of law and morality.”33 Swindles fuel manias,
signal panics and deepen financial distress.34 History is replete with
examples.35 The U.S. therefore faces an urgent need to reimpose
sanctions for securities fraud or face the inevitable fallout from laxity
towards securities fraud: serial financial collapses.
A grand experiment in judicial and legislative encouragement of
securities fraud now has failed.36 Congress and the courts should
reverse that experiment as promptly and thoroughly as possible and
policymakers should seek to restore the private securities remedies to
their historic policy underpinnings.37 That means rolling back securities
litigation restrictions.38 Congress and the courts must restore deterrence
33.
34.
35.
36.

CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES 73 (4th ed. 2000).
Id. at 73, 77.
Id. at 73–90.
The PSLRA rested on a weak evidentiary foundation from the beginning. GARY W.
SHORTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM: HAVE FRIVOLOUS
SHAREHOLDER SUITS EXPLODED? CRS-34 (1995) (“On balance the evidence does not appear to
be compelling enough for one to conclude that warrantless class action suits have
exploded . . . .”); John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding Road to
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 BUS. LAW. 335, 339–40 (1996) (“At
Senate hearings . . . much of the testimony focused on the perception of a securities litigation
crisis. Many of the witnesses gave anecdotal evidence of widespread abuses in the private
litigation system, but the empirical evidence was inconclusive.”). It is noteworthy that the attack
on private securities litigation coincided with soaring economic inequality in the U.S. See
RAMIREZ, supra note 7, at 36.
37. Congress acted specifically with the intent of averting “national emergencies” that
produced unemployment and macroeconomic dislocation arising from chicanery in the securities
markets. 15 U.S.C. §78b (2012).
38. The irrational indulgences granted to securities fraudfeasors have been critiqued by a
number of scholars. This is the only Article that advocates a return to the broad private remedies
of decades past in response to compelling evidence of the macroeconomic costs of massive
securities fraud implicit in recurring financial crises. See, e.g., Barbara Black, Eliminating
Securities Fraud Class Actions Under the Radar, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 802, 816 (arguing
that the PSLRA results in under-deterrence of fraud); Hillary A. Sale, Heightened Pleading and
Discovery Stays: An Analysis of the Effect of the PSLRA’s Internal-Information Standard on ‘33
and ‘34 Act Claims, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 537, 583 (1998) (advocating against the stay of discovery
under the PSLRA); Elliott J. Weiss & Janet E. Moser, Enter Yossarian: How to Resolve the
Procedural Catch-22 that the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Creates, 76 WASH. U.
L.Q. 457, 472 (1998) (arguing that the pleading demands are unduly burdensome on shareholders
when they are denied discovery); see also John C. Coffee Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About
the Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57 BUS. LAW. 1403, 1403 (2002) (suggesting that the PSLRA’s
protection of auditors from liability for their errors was one factor contributing to the Enron-era
scandals); Andre Douglas Pond Cummings, Still “Ain’t No Glory in Pain”: How the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 and Other 1990s Deregulation Facilitated the Market Crash of
2002, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 467, 471–72 (2007) (“Studies have shown that the
PSLRA, SLUSA and other deregulatory initiatives in the mid-1990s enabled an environment that
almost invited the fraud that spun out of control in the corporate fiascos of Enron, WorldCom,
Tyco, Adelphia, ImClone and Global Crossing.”). For the most part, commentators neglect the
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before our nation suffers yet another macroeconomic catastrophe rooted
in massive securities fraud.39
I. A SHORT HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
Prior to the 1930s, state law primarily governed disclosure of
material facts in connection with securities transactions. 40 In this regard
state law proved woefully deficient.41 For example, state law did not
mandate that publicly traded firms disclose any facts to shareholders,
not even essential information such as audited financial statements.42
Instead, shareholders needed to press claims for information through
individual lawsuits.43 Fraud claims faced severe restrictions because
(among other problems), in an impersonal market, transaction
participants generally owe no duty of disclosure.44 State Blue Sky laws
failed to effectively enforce disclosure requirements across state lines, a
measure which became increasingly necessary as a result of the
nationwide character of the securities business.45 Securities sales
literature was “too often deliberately misleading.”46 This all meant that
market participants lacked access to even basic material facts.47
role that securities fraud (and other associated misconduct) plays in financial crises and
macroeconomic disruptions. See Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities
Fraud Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173, 2184 (2010) (discussing the
costs of violations of the securities laws but failing to discuss financial instability and
macroeconomic disruptions).
39. Private actions likely deter more than SEC actions as private claims are associated with
greater sanctions. Stephen J. Choi & Adam C. Pritchard, SEC Investigations and Securities Class
Actions: An Empirical Comparison 12 (Univ. of Mich. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series,
Paper No. 12-022, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=21
09739.
40. Dean Seligman shows that the rules of stock exchanges prior to the federal securities laws
also failed to secure adequate disclosure for investors due to limited enforcement. Seligman,
Historical Need, supra note 12, at 54–57.
41. SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 282 (2d ed.
1972) (“Certain states such as Delaware and New Jersey allowed anyone paying a registration fee
to incorporate a company, leaving its directors free to issue new stock, and with no obligation to
make an annual report or an accounting.”). Delaware still does not mandate disclosure of any
information to shareholders. Other than the federal securities laws, disclosure obligations of
corporations are “narrow to non-existent.” MELVIN ARON EISENBERG & JAMES D. COX,
CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 363 (10th ed. unabr. 2011).
42. LOUIS LOSS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 288 (4th ed. 2006).
43. EISENBERG & COX, supra note 41, at 362.
44. E.g., Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 660 (Mass. 1933) (holding that mere silence does
not amount to a breach of duty).
45. LOSS ET AL., supra note 42, at 233–38.
46. H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 2–3 (1933).
47. See DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR 368 (1999) (concluding that while the
federal securities laws imposed new disclosure obligations on businesses, the enhanced flow of
information improves economic efficiency of financial markets and thereby rationalizes the
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Consequently, investment rested on guesses and gambles.48 Modern
capitalism (as well as market efficiency theory) demanded a superior
informational foundation to drive investment.49
Such a reality creates fertile ground for panics, and the U.S. suffered
major financial panics in 1873, 1893 and 1907.50 The greatest financial
collapse of all occurred in 1929, when the U.S. suffered an historic
stock market crash.51 The aggregate value of all stocks listed on the
New York Stock Exchange fell from $89 billion in the fall of 1929 to
$15 billion in 1932.52 Subsequent Congressional inquiries implicated,
in the words of Joseph P. Kennedy, “practically all the important names
in the financial community in practices which, to say the least, were
highly unethical.”53 Economist John Kenneth Galbraith echoed that
conclusion: “American enterprise in the twenties had opened its
securities laws in accordance with free-market theory).
48. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 470 (1958). “Virtually
none of the critics of the SEC’s mandatory corporate disclosure system during the New Deal
questioned the need for a compulsory corporate disclosure system.” Seligman, Historical Need,
supra note 12, at 2.
49. See Theresa A. Gabaldon, John Law, with a Tulip, in the South Seas: Gambling and the
Regulation of Euphoric Market Transactions, 26 J. CORP. L. 225, 269–270, 271–72 (2001)
(reviewing the underlying assumptions of market efficiency and concluding that the federal
securities laws facilitate efficiency by assuring a minimum level of disclosure).
50. MORISON, supra note 41, at 37, 111–13, 151–52 (stock speculation contributed to the
Panic of 1873; bank failures and a panic in the London securities market for American shares
triggered the Panic of 1893; and, stock speculation and the overextension of credit led to the
Panic of 1907).
51. See H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 2 (stating that between 1920 and 1930 about one-half of the
$50 billion of new securities issued were worthless). Additionally, the subprime mortgages of the
2008 crisis harken back to massive investments in foreign bonds during the run up to the crash in
the late 1920s. SCHLESINGER, supra note 48, at 437–38 (recounting how Wall Street bankers
peddled foreign bonds to American investors despite expert opinions that the bonds would default
and without disclosure of bribes paid to foreign officials). Indeed, National City Company went
forward with an offering of foreign bonds issued by a Brazilian state that was fantastically lax and
borrowed in “complete ignorance, carelessness and negligence” of the long term financial
consequences. Id. at 438. One fraudfeasor simply forged Italian bonds to deceive investors.
MORISON, supra note 41, at 285. National City and Chase Bank continued to sell foreign bonds
at pre-default prices even after the governments involved disclosed to the banks that no further
interest would be paid on the debt. KINDLEBERGER, supra note 33, at 80
52. LOSS ET AL., supra note 42, at 255–56. Additionally, one-half of all the foreign securities
purchased by the American public defaulted. Id. The total loss in all securities amounted to $93
billion between 1929 and 1931. Id.
53. SCHLESINGER, supra note 48, at 423. For example, the House of Morgan maintained a
preferred list of highly connected customers that qualified to buy stock at a deep discount to the
price available to the public customers. The New York Times termed this practice a “gross
impropriety,” and the Governor of Kansas called it “bribery.” Id. at 436. The Chairman of Chase
National Bank, the previously highly regarded Andrew Wiggin, further exemplifies Kennedy’s
point. He sold massive securities in his own firm while simultaneously knowing that the firm
embarked on a repurchase campaign to the tune of $800 million. Steve Thel, The Original
Conception of Section 10(b), 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 413 n.118 (1990).
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hospitable arms to an exceptional number of promoters, grafters,
swindlers, imposters and frauds. This, in the long history of such
activities, was a kind of flood tide of corporate larceny.”54 By the mid1930s the economy suffered from crippling declines in investor
confidence and investment collapsed, leading to the Great Depression.55
A modern industrial economy requires an advanced financial system
to provide sufficient capital flows and investment to fund growth.56
Deep and liquid financial markets do the job.57 However, “the public
must have confidence in the integrity of our financial markets in order
to insure a stable and inexpensive source of capital for American
business growth.”58 When that confidence flags and investors head for

54. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 1929, at 178 (1954); see also 3
MORISON, supra note 41, at 281–86 (describing and detailing the nefarious activities underlying
the “greatest orgy of speculation and over-optimism since the South Sea Bubble of 1720”).
Historian Morison’s account of financial markets before the Depression illustrates well the
problem with markets infected by massive securities fraud. Between the bear raids, the insider
dealing and manipulative stock pools described by Morison, one must conclude that it was simply
impossible to invest intelligently in securities. Id. at 282–85. The simple thread in all of these
nefarious devices is that stock prices move in accordance with information not available to an
ordinary securities investor. We will see this historic fact repeated in 2008.
55. “[I]nvestor confidence was so low before the enactment of the federal securities laws that
the issuance of new corporate securities had plummeted from $9.4 billion in 1929 to $380 million
in 1933.” Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform, supra note 11, at 1066 n.35 (citing I LOUIS LOSS &
JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 216 (3d ed. 1998)). The term “panic” captures the
notion of irrational and indiscriminate selling of financial assets. For example, in the early 1930s,
there was a run on German Banks after the failure of Creditanstalt in Vienna that was partly
fueled by a failure of speculators to understand the difference between Germany and Austria.
KINDLEBERGER, supra note 33, at 77. Panics simply operate as the inevitable flipside of manias,
which fuel bubbles. Disclosure of material facts stems both psychological states; therefore,
investor confidence is inherently tied to reality through full disclosure of truthful information.
56. E.g., Ross Levine & Sara Zervos, Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth, 88 AM.
ECON. REV. 537, 538 (1998) (relating economic growth to financial development); Maurice
Obstfeld, Risk-Taking, Global Diversification and Growth, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 1310, 1326–27
(1994) (finding that the ability of investors to diversify through markets encourages growth).
57. E.g., Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Vojislav Maksimovic, Law, Finance and Firm Growth, 53 J.
FIN. 2107, 2134 (1998) (finding that firms in countries with active stock markets were able to
obtain greater funds to finance growth); Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Financial
Dependence and Growth, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 559, 584 (1998) (finding that industries dependent
on external finance are more developed in countries with better protection of external investors).
58. Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform, supra note 11, at 1057 (“[I]ncreasing investor
confidence . . . may have important economic consequences. By reducing the perceived risk of
corporate securities, compulsory disclosure would tend to reduce the risk premia that issuers . . .
would have to pay, thus increasing the funds available for economic growth.” (citing LOSS &
SELIGMAN, supra note 55, at 217–18)). Empirical studies have shown that more robust investor
protection and securities regulation laws—including stricter enforcement of disclosure
mandates—support a lower cost of capital for firms. Luzi Hail & Christian Leuz, International
Differences in the Cost of Equity Capital: Do Legal Institutions and Securities Regulation
Matter?, 44 J. ACCT. RES. 485, 488 (2006) (“Firms in countries with more extensive disclosure
requirements, stronger securities regulation, and more effective legal systems have a significantly
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the exits en masse, the very viability of capitalism itself falls into
question59 as macroeconomic pain mounts.60 In just the twenty-five
years before the federal securities laws, the nation endured three such
macroeconomic catastrophes.61 Congress recognized, finally, that
securities transactions are the lifeblood of modern capitalism and
require regulation to stem fraud, speculation, panics and general
economic catastrophe.62
A. The Original Conception of the Federal Securities Laws
Shortly after taking office, President Franklin Roosevelt proposed
legislation that ultimately became the Securities Act. 63 Indeed, the Act
was a cornerstone of the famous 100 days when President Roosevelt
took vigorous action to address the economic cataclysm of the Great
Depression.64 The federal role in securities regulation thus has its roots
in the financial and macroeconomic catastrophe of the Great
Depression.65 The President and Congress intended to insure disclosure
to investors.66 The Securities Act required the registration (and
lower cost of capital.”).
59. Nouriel Roubini, Is Capitalism Doomed?, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Aug. 15, 2011),
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/is-capitalism-doomed.
60. Thomas Mucha, America the Gutted: What Happens When the Middle Class Disappears?,
CNBC (Sept. 12, 2012), http://www.cnbc.com/id/48998081.
61. As I wrote in 2003:
In 1920 to 1922, the economy contracted 17.3%. In 1907, the economy contracted
7.4%. In 1929 to 1933, the economy contracted 33%. Since then there has not been a
single contraction of the same magnitude as these three contractions. Thus, from 1907
to 1929, a period of twenty-two years, the economy suffered three significant
contractions. In seventy years since the beginning of the New Deal, no contraction of
similar magnitude has occurred. Since the end of the Depression in 1938, there has
only been one year of negative economic growth. In 1949, the economy suffered a
contraction of 0.8%.
Ramirez, The Law and Macroeconomics of the New Deal, supra note 20, at 564 n.377.
62. In the words of Congress:
National emergencies, which produce widespread unemployment and the dislocation of
trade, transportation, and industry, and which burden interstate commerce and
adversely affect the general welfare, are precipitated, intensified, and prolonged by
manipulation and sudden and unreasonable fluctuations of security prices and by
excessive speculation on such exchanges and markets, and to meet such emergencies
the Federal Government is put to such great expense as to burden the national credit.
15 U.S.C. § 78b(4) (2012).
63. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a–77zz).
64. SCHLESINGER, supra note 48, at 1–23.
65. During the Great Depression, unemployment peaked at over 25% and GDP contracted by
over 30%. Steven A. Ramirez, The Law and Macroeconomics of the New Deal, supra note 20, at
524.
66. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953) (“The design of the statute is to
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accompanying full disclosure) of initial distributions of securities.67
The Act focused primarily upon initial offerings of securities.68
Nevertheless, the Securities Act also provided broad private remedies
for those investing in securities based upon a material
misrepresentation—at least as a matter of the plain meaning of the
statute.69 These broad remedies sought to inspire, through fear of
liability, broader disclosure and more careful marketing in connection
with the sale of securities.70
In order to fill out the gaps left, Congress enacted the Exchange Act,
which required periodic disclosure for publicly held companies and
created the SEC to monitor securities exchanges and enforce the new
laws.71 The Exchange Act also directed the newly minted agency to
promulgate broad anti-fraud rules.72 The SEC ultimately imposed Rule
10b-5,73 the broadest anti-fraud provision under the federal securities
protect investors by promoting full disclosure of information thought necessary to informed
investment decisions.”).
67. MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW §§ 1.02, 4.01 (6th ed. 2009).
68. Id.
69. Under section 12(a)(2) (formerly section 12(2)) of the Securities Act:
Any person who offers or sells a security . . . by means of a prospectus or oral
communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not
knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of proof
that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of
such untruth or omission, shall be liable . . . to the person purchasing such security . . .
to recover the consideration paid for such security with interest thereon.
15 U.S.C. 771(a)(2) (2012).
70. William O. Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23 YALE REV. 522, 523–26 (1934),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1934/030034douglas.pdf.
71. STEINBERG, supra note 67, §§ 1.02, 5.03.
72. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange—
To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on
a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, . . . any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
73. Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
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laws applying to both purchases and sales of securities and broadly
reaching all fraud in connection with securities transactions, and
beyond—at least as a matter of the plain meaning of the legislative
regulation.74 Indeed, Professor Thel persuasively demonstrates that the
original object of Rule 10b-5 focused on punishing those engaged in
wrongdoing in connection with the purchase or sale of securities for
wrongdoing of less than fraud.75
Roosevelt made clear that these acts were designed to heighten
disclosure obligations in securities transactions in order to restore public
confidence in the nation’s financial markets.76 Congress joined the
President in emphasizing the importance of investor confidence within a
modern economic system.77 Broad federal remedies played a vital role
in the federal regulatory overlay, and those remedies operated
cumulatively with any state remedies so that federal law could only
enhance investor rights.78 The Securities Act as well as the Exchange
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013).
74. Thel, supra note 53, at 385–86 (arguing that the events surrounding passage of the
Exchange Act and section 10(b) show that the provision was intended to empower the SEC to
regulate any practice that might contribute to speculation in securities or tend to move security
prices away from investment value—an interpretation that, while consistent with the language
and structure of the Exchange Act, is fundamentally different from the judicial construction of
section 10(b)).
75. Id. at 387–90.
76. “This proposal . . . puts the burden of telling the whole truth on the seller. It should give
impetus to honest dealing in securities and thereby bring back public confidence.” H. R. REP. NO.
73-85, at 2 (1933) (quoting letter from President Franklin D. Roosevelt regarding the Securities
Act of 1933); see also SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (“A
fundamental purpose [of the federal securities laws] was to substitute a philosophy of full
disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business
ethics in the securities industry.”).
77. The House Report accompanying the Exchange Act states:
Unless constant extension of the legal conception of a fiduciary relationship—a
guarantee of “straight shooting”—supports the constant extension of mutual
confidence which is the foundation of a maturing and complicated economic system,
easy liquidity of the resources in which wealth is invested is a danger rather than a prop
to the stability of that system. When everything everyone owns can be sold at once,
there must be confidence not to sell. Just in proportion as it becomes more liquid and
complicated, an economic system must become more moderate, more honest, and more
justifiably self-trusting.
H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 5 (1934).
78. The “purpose of the [federal securities laws] is to expand, not restrict the public’s
remedies.” Sennott v. Rodman & Renshaw, 414 U.S. 926, 929 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting
from order denying certiorari). One of Congress’s primary objectives in enacting the federal
securities laws was to “rectify perceived deficiencies in the available common-law protections.”
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983). The power of the states over
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Act made this point perfectly clear.79 Those remedies specifically
sought to avert the problems with state law claims and accompanying
hyper-technicalities.80 The original conception of the federal securities
laws intended to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for traditional
notions of caveat emptor.81
This original conception of the federal securities laws can only be
termed hugely successful.82 In fact, despite dire predictions from the
experts running Wall Street, securities distributions revived in 1935,
when initial offerings more than doubled the amount floated in 1933, to
$800 million.83 Full disclosure of material facts backed by both public
and private enforcement ultimately secured investor confidence and
therefore investment.84 Since then, stock market valuations and stock
ownership has soared.85 Ultimately the federal securities laws,
including broad private remedies, became a model internationally. 86
securities-related claims, and remedies available to investors under state law, had been preserved
since the very incipiency of federal securities regulation. Only in 1998 did Congress see fit to
preempt state law claims through the SLUSA.
79. See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (2012) (“The rights and remedies provided by this chapter shall be
in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity.”); see also
id. § 77p (same).
80. See I LOUIS LOSS ET AL., supra note 42, at 262–63 (citing Douglas, supra note 70) (stating
that the new expanded liabilities under the Securities Act will protect investors by inspiring care
rather than recklessness).
81. “This proposal adds to the ancient rule caveat emptor, the further doctrine ‘let the seller
also beware.’ It puts the burden of telling the whole truth on the seller.” H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at
2 (quoting letter from President Franklin Roosevelt).
82. See S. REP. NO. 104–98, at 37 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 715
(presenting comments by Sens. Sarbanes, Bryan and Boxer that “[o]ur securities markets have
been operating under the Federal securities laws since those laws were enacted 60 years ago . . .
[and] our markets today are the largest and most vibrant in the world . . . not in spite of the
Federal securities laws, but in part because of the Federal securities laws”); U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission Chairman Arthur Levitt, Remarks at 22nd Annual Securities Regulation
Institute, in 1 PRACTICING LAW INST., SWEEPING REFORM: LITIGATING AND BESPEAKING
CAUTION UNDER THE NEW SECURITIES LAW 300, 304 (1996) (“Our markets are the best in the
world, partly because our securities laws are the best in the world.”); see also Irwin Friend &
Edward S. Herman, The S.E.C. Through a Glass Darkly, 37 J. BUS. 382, 389 (1964) (“We doubt
that any person reasonably well acquainted with the evolution of stockmarket practices between
the pre- and post-SEC periods could lament or underrate the success of the new legislation in
eradicating many of [the] weaknesses in our capital markets.”).
83. SCHLESINGER, supra note 48, at 462–64, 469–70.
84. See 3 MORISON, supra note 41, at 306–09 (stating that the federal securities laws worked a
permanent reform of American capitalism); see also Joel Seligman, Memories of Bill Carey, 2013
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 318, 328 (showing an explosion in private securities litigation starting in
1961).
85. LOUIS LOSS ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 8 (6th ed. 2011)
(stating that stock ownership has expanded from 1.5% of the population in 1930 to nearly 50% of
the population in 2008).
86. Dr. Gerhard Wegen, Congratulations from Your Continental Cousins, 10b-5: Securities
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More importantly, this original conception of the federal securities
laws ushered in an unprecedented era of financial stability.87 For
example, after the New Deal,88 bank failures nearly disappeared from
the U.S., until they spiked again in 2007–2011 to even higher levels (as
a percentage of gross domestic product (“GDP”)).89 After the Great
Depression the nation did not suffer another macroeconomically
significant financial crisis until 2007.90
Either anti-inflationary
monetary policy or oil price shocks caused the more significant
recessions of the post-World War II era prior to 2007.91 In fact,
Professor Kindleberger’s landmark study of macroeconomically
significant financial crises, Manias, Panics and Crashes, did not
identify or discuss any post-World War II financial crisis in the U.S.
that led to an economic recession.92 Only after the betrayal of the
original conception of the federal securities laws (as will be shown) did
a massive financial crisis strike the U.S., leading to macroeconomic
distress.93 In fact, the Great Recession of 2008 ultimately proved to be
Fraud Regulation From the European Perspective, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. S57, S74 (1993)
(inviting Rule 10b-5 to “visit” both Western and Eastern Europe); Going for the Golden Egg,
ECONOMIST, Sept. 28–Oct. 4, 1996, at 89–90 (stating that “America has been much better than
Europe at hatching small firms” and detailing European efforts to imitate American securities
markets).
87. E.g., KINDLEBERGER, supra note 33, at 1 (“[R]ecessions from 1945 to 1973 were few, far
between, and exceptionally mild.”).
88. I have consistently posited that many New Deal innovations contributed to this financial
stability. See, e.g., Ramirez, The Law and Macroeconomics of the New Deal, supra note 20, at
569–72.
89. David Cay Johnston, The Taxpayers’ Burden, REUTERS, Dec. 4, 2011, available at
http://blogs.reuters.com/david-cay-johnston/2011/12/04/the-taxpayers-burden/ (showing that
failed deposits as a percentage of GDP peaked in 1933 and 2008–2009 after a long period of
small and few failures).
90. In 1984, a financial crisis hit the U.S. as the result of the failure of massive numbers of
savings and loans. Nevertheless, this financial crisis (although clearly the most significant
financial crisis since World War II other than the subprime crisis) was a “relatively mild” crisis
compared to the Great Depression and the subprime debacle. CARMEN M. REINHART &
KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT 216 (2009).
91. The most significant post-war recession prior to the Great Recession of 2007–2009 was
the recession of 1981–1982, and it was caused by the aggressive use of monetary policy to fight
inflation. TODD A. KNOPP, RECESSIONS AND DEPRESSIONS 168 (2d ed. 2010). Another
significant recession in 1973–1975 was triggered by high oil prices. Id. at 167. Oil Price hikes
also triggered less significant recessions in 1991 and 1980. Id. at 169. Tight monetary and credit
conditions led to a number of milder recessions between 1946 and 1961, as well as in 1969. Id. at
164, 166.
92. KINDLEBERGER, supra note 33, at 21–22 (predicting that macroeconomically significant
financial crises in the U.S. may not be a “relic of the past” but failing to identify any such event in
the U.S. in the course of discussing his model’s relevancy as of 2000). Professor Kindleberger’s
study is limited to macroeconomically significant financial crises. Id. at 1.
93. YOUSSEF CASSIS, CRISES AND OPPORTUNITIES 150 (2011) (“The financial debacle of
2007–8 was the most severe financial crisis in modern history.”). This essentially echoes the
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the deepest and longest economic contraction since the Great
Depression.94 Further, the recession spawned more job losses than any
contraction since the Great Depression as well as a painfully slow
recovery.95
The courts initially embraced the remedial nature of the federal
securities laws and broadly interpreted their provisions to achieve those
ends.96 Further, the courts, as well as the SEC, recognized the crucial
role of private securities enforcement proceedings as an essential
supplement to the SEC’s limited enforcement resources.97 Indeed, in
1946, the federal courts began to imply private rights of action under the
federal securities laws.98 Since then, the Supreme Court has determined
the existence of a private action under Rule 10b-5 to be “beyond
conclusion of the last two Federal Reserve Chairmen, Ben Bernanke and Alan Greenspan. See
supra note 2.
94. Increasingly, economists refer to the recession of 2007–2009 as the Great Recession.
Thomas F. Siems, Branding the Great Recession, DALLASFED (May 31, 2012), http://www.
dallasfed.org/assets/documents/banking/firm/fi/fi1201.pdf (“Depicting the 2008 economic
downturn as the Great Recession seems justifiable. It was the longest and deepest economic
contraction, as measured by the drop in real GDP, since the Great Depression.”).
95. Id. (“[T]he time it took to return to prerecession peak output was far longer than any other
post-Great Depression recovery. Job losses during the Great Recession were also the most
dreadful since the Great Depression.”).
96. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972)
(noting that the intent of the Exchange Act was to “‘achieve a high standard of business ethics in
the securities industry’” and must “be construed . . . ‘flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes’”
(quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186, 195 (1963)); Silver v. N.Y.
Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 366 (1963) (“It requires but little appreciation of . . . what
happened in . . . the 1920’s and 1930’s to realize how essential it is that the highest ethical
standards prevail as to every aspect of the [securities markets].”).
97. See, e.g., Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985) (stating
that private actions are indispensable for the enforcement of securities laws); Berner v. Lazzaro,
730 F.2d 1319, 1322 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he resources of the [SEC] are adequate to prosecute
only the most flagrant abuses.”).
98. See Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (implying a
private right of action under the federal securities laws). The SEC filed a brief in Kardon
demonstrating its intent that Rule 10b-5 give rise to a private right of action. See Joseph A.
Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The
Commission’s Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 961, 990 n.130 (1994) (“The Commission filed an
amicus brief in Kardon urging the court to imply a private right of action under Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 on precisely the grounds on which the court ultimately relied.”). The SEC filed this
brief only four years after it had promulgated Rule 10b-5. Id. Additionally, the SEC consistently
advocated for private rights of action for violations of the federal securities throughout the 1940s.
Id. at 990. The SEC has consistently asserted that the private remedy under Rule 10b-5 is a
“necessary supplement” to the SEC’s enforcement powers and a “most effective” enforcement
tool. See Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae at 1, Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis, & Petigrow v.
Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991) (No. 90-333); Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae at 6, Herman
& MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) (Nos. 81-680, 81-1076); Brief for the SEC
as Amicus Curiae at 10 n.2, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193–94 (1976) (No. 741042).
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peradventure,”99 and has proceeded to define this implied private right
of action in a series of opinions.100 The Court, with the support of the
SEC, allowed the private remedy under Rule 10b-5 to thrive, and no
Justice has ever seriously questioned the propriety of recognizing such a
remedy.101
Congress also supported the fundamental approach of the federal
securities laws and recognized the key role they played in the prosperity
of the nation since the Great Depression. Thus, Congress amended the
federal securities laws numerous times since the 1930s, but before the
1990s these amendments invariably operated to enhance their reach and
to extend the basic theme of investor protection.102 Notably, none of
these amendments operated to curtail private remedies even though
those remedies operated robustly to secure deterrence in full view of
Congress.103 Moreover, in the legislative history accompanying these
amendments, Congress heaped praise on the federal securities laws with
no mention at all of any problems arising from private securities
litigation.104
Ultimately, demanding responsibility and basic

99. Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 380.
100. E.g., Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193–94 (holding that a Rule 10b-5 plaintiff must allege
and prove scienter); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) (holding
that a Rule 10b-5 plaintiff must be an actual seller or purchaser); Superintendent of Ins. of State
of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 169 (1971) (“[W]e read § 10(b) to mean that
Congress meant to bar deceptive devices and contrivances in the purchase or sale of securities
whether conducted in the organized markets or face to face.”).
101. David S. Ruder, The Development of Legal Doctrine Through Amicus Participation: The
SEC Experience, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 1167, 1168 (pointing out, as former Chairman of the SEC,
that “private securities litigation plays an essential role in federal securities regulation” and that
approximately 90% of securities cases were privately pursued in 1988).
102. See Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (expanding SEC oversight of self-regulatory
organizations that supervise broker-dealers); Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-598, 84 Stat. 1636 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa–78111) (extending
insurance to balances held by securities broker-dealers); Securities Acts Amendments of 1964,
Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.)
(extending the regulatory power of the federal securities laws and the SEC to over-the-counter
markets).
103. The first recognition of an implied remedy under Rule 10b-5 occurred in 1946. See
Kardon, 69 F. Supp. at 514. The Supreme Court first took up the issue of implied remedies in
1964. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (stating that private litigation is a
most effective weapon in the enforcement of the securities laws and a necessary supplement to
Commission resources). Congress, however, maintained its focus on protecting investor
confidence rather than any concerns on supposed vexatiousness.
104. For example, in 1964 Congress (through the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce) stated:
The Securities Act of 1933, relating to truthful disclosure of information about new
security offerings; the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, relating to disclosure of
information about listed securities and regulating practices in exchange and over-the-
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accountability of corporate and financial elites105 proved
unsustainable.106 Memories faded, unprecedented prosperity and
inequality took root,107 and elites quickly used their vast resources to
replicate the preconditions of the Great Depression.108
B. The War on Private Securities Litigation
The success of the federal securities laws bred complacency. 109

counter operations; and succeeding legislation which is administered by the Securities
and Exchange Commission; represent legislation of which this committee and the
Congress are justly proud. These statutes have gone a long way in the mitigation and
elimination of undesirable practices in the securities field, in the restoration of
confidence in securities markets, and in the protection of the investing public.
H.R. REP. NO. 88-1418, at 4 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3013, 3016. Congress has
emphasized investor protection and investor confidence as an important, even compelling, policy
objective because “[i]t is a basic teaching of this nation’s financial history that continued
economic health fundamentally depends upon the maintenance of investor confidence.” H.R.
REP. NO. 94-123, at 43–44 (1975); see also S. REP. NO. 91-1218, at 2 (1970), reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5254, 5256; H.R. REP. NO. 88-1418, at 6–7 (demonstrating congressional
determination to maintain investor confidence).
105. This was the overall intent of the federal securities laws. See 86 CONG. REC. 5231
(1940) (statement of the President upon the signing of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940)
(“[A] conscientious and successful effort has been made to require the investment banker, the
broker, and the dealer, the security salesman, the issuer, and the great financial institutions
themselves to recognize the high responsibilities they owe to the public.”).
106. Former SEC Chair and Justice William O. Douglas predicted in 1934 that the use of
litigation to protect investors would ultimately be subject to sustained political attack and
emasculation by the courts. Douglas, supra note 70, at 525.
107. See KNOPP, supra note 91, at 169 (noting that the longest economic expansion in U.S.
history commenced in 1991 and ended in 2001). Economists predict that higher inequality leads
to subverted law in favor of the very rich. See Edward Glaeser, Jose Scheinkman & Andrei
Shleifer, The Injustice of Inequality, 50 J. MONETARY ECON. 199, 200 (2003) (“[I]f political and
regulatory institutions can be moved by wealth or influence, they will favor the established, not
the efficient.”).
108. See generally Carbone, supra note 30, at 1035–49.
109. According to Andrew Lo:
During extended periods of prosperity, market participants become complacent about
the risk of loss—either through systematic under-estimation of those risks because of
recent history, or a decline in their risk aversion due to increasing wealth, or both. In
fact, there is mounting evidence from cognitive neuroscientists that financial gain
affects the same “pleasure centers” of the brain that are activated by certain narcotics.
This suggests that prolonged periods of economic growth and prosperity can induce a
collective sense of euphoria and complacency among investors that is not unlike the
drug-induced stupor of a cocaine addict. Moreover, the financial liberalization that
typically accompanies this prosperity implies greater availability of risk capital, greater
competition for new sources of excess expected returns, more highly correlated risktaking behavior because of the “crowded trade” phenomenon, and a false sense of
security derived from peers who engage in the same behavior and with apparent
success.
Andrew W. Lo, Written Testimony Prepared for the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform Hearing on Hedge Funds: Hedge Funds, Systemic Risk, and
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Financial elites never held the federal securities laws in high esteem.110
Before their enactment many financial elites claimed the “grass would
grow on Wall Street.”111 Not long after the enactment of the federal
securities laws, experts predicted that memories would fade and that
those holding economic power would exploit those fading memories to
undercut the federal securities laws.112 After all, the homeless and
those on food stamps do not get sued under the federal securities
laws.113 Given the huge lobbying resources that corporate and financial
the Financial Crisis of 2007–2008 12–13 (Nov. 13, 2008) (citations omitted), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1301217.
110. Elite hostility to the constraints implicit in the federal securities laws, in general, and
robust private remedies, in particular, makes sense. Even after decades of judicial and legislative
paring, private actions still operated to impose damages of up to $19 billion per annum in recent
years. See ELLEN M. RYAN & LAURA E. SIMMONS, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES
CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS: 2011 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 1 (2011) [hereinafter
CORNERSTONE SETTLEMENTS 2011] (charting total settlement dollars in court-approved
securities class action settlements from 2002–2011). One can only imagine the deterrent and
compensatory power of private securities litigation in full bloom in accordance with the rollbacks
offered in this Article. Of course, as previously shown, under private securities litigation there
are many sanctions imposed upon corporate managers beyond paying damages to victims of
securities fraud—ranging from steep stock price declines to a higher risk of bankruptcy. See
supra note 22.
111. DAVID RATNER, SECURITIES REGULATION IN A NUTSHELL § 11 (2d ed. 1982).
112. One visionary was Ferdinand Pecora. Pecora served for seventeen months, from January
1933 to July 1934, as counsel to the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, during the time
of hearings on the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. See FERDINAND PECORA, WALL STREET
UNDER OATH: THE STORY OF OUR MODERN MONEY CHANGERS 3 (1939) (Augustus M. Kelley
ed., 1973). Pecora published a summary of those congressional hearings because “[a]fter five
short years, we may now need to be reminded what Wall Street was like before Uncle Sam
stationed a policeman at its corner.” Id. at xi. Pecora was prescient in predicting a failure of
public memory:
Under the surface of the governmental regulation of the securities market, the same
forces that produced the riotous speculative excesses of the “wild bull market” of 1929
still give evidences of their existence and influence. Though repressed for the present,
it cannot be doubted that, given a suitable opportunity, they would spring back into
pernicious activity. Frequently we are told that this regulation has been throttling the
country’s prosperity. Bitterly hostile was Wall Street to the enactment of the
regulatory legislation. It now looks forward to the day when it shall, as it hopes,
reassume the reins of its former power. . . . The public, however, is sometimes
forgetful. As its memory of the unhappy market collapse of 1929 becomes blurred, it
may lend at least one ear to the persuasive voices of The Street subtly pleading for a
return to the “good old times.” Forgotten, perhaps, by some are the shattering
revelations of the Senate Committee’s investigation.
Id. at ix–x.
113. As Professor Miller observes:
I think it is fair to say that a number of the Justices (as well as other federal judges)
have a predilection (perhaps subliminal) that favors business and governmental
interests. Surely, a significant number of opinions in recent years do show that
orientation. Nor do I think it unfair to say that some Justices on the current Court and
some members of the federal judiciary are disenchanted with civil litigation and wish
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elites control, an attack on the federal securities laws seemed
inevitable.114
Soon, private securities litigation fell into scorn and disrepute.115
Judicial impulses to protect the powerful necessarily permeated the
federal courts over time at least insofar as private securities litigation is
concerned.116 By the 1990s, the Supreme Court in particular seemed
determined to reign in private securities claims. In 1991, in Lampf,
to limit it, which, of course, negatively impacts access and works against those in our
lower and middle economic classes who want entre to the civil justice system. That is
an unfortunate echo of today’s societal inequities and reflects the stunning disparity in
power, people’s income, and status in our nation.
Miller, supra note 16, at 366–67. It is noteworthy that the government subsidizes the legal
expenses of every securities fraudfeasor through the tax system. See JEROLD S. AUERBACH,
JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 144 (1983) (terming deductibility of legal fees for businesses “a gigantic
government subsidy”).
114. See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT xviii
(2011) [hereinafter FCIC REPORT] (finding that the financial sector spent $2.7 billion in lobbying
expenses from 1999 to 2008 and $1 billion in campaign contributions through political action
committees). The press tagged the PSLRA as a prime example of influence peddling. Dowd,
supra note 10, at 132 (listing the PSLRA as the top example of the relationship between laws,
money and lobbying, and noting that PSLRA was backed by a $29.6 million war chest); see also
Douglas M. Branson, Running the Gauntlet: A Description of the Arduous, and Now Often Fatal
Journey for Plaintiffs in Fed. Sec. Law Actions, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 3, 24 (1996) (examining
supposed policy arguments in favor of the PSLRA and concluding that none was sound and that
“[i]nstead, money . . . and politics . . . fueled the rush to enact [the] draconian” PSLRA); D. Brian
Hufford, Deterring Fraud vs. Avoiding the Strike Suit, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 593, 641 (1995)
(“Ultimately, the evidence does not support the securities reform advocates . . . the [PSLRA]
arises from . . . well-funded public relations and lobbying efforts . . . .”).
115. The broadest and most litigated provision of the federal securities laws is Rule 10b-5
which prohibits fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. In order for a plaintiff
to state a claim for securities fraud under Rule 10b-5 they must prove: (1) a material
misrepresentation or omission; (2) made with scienter (i.e., an intent to defraud); (3) inducing
reliance; (4) causing; (5) damages. Allyson Poulos et al., Securities Fraud, 50 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1479, 1482–83 (2013). As such, it is difficult if not impossible to fathom judicial and
legislative licentiousness for securities fraudfeasors. Class biases and excessive judicial
discretion have so far been offered for the odd and inexplicable attitudes that cropped up in the
1990s to support protective judicial doctrines for fraudfeasors and those knowingly aiding
securities fraudfeasors. See Dain C. Donelson & Robert A. Prentice, Scienter Pleading and Rule
10b-5: Empirical Analysis and Behavioral Implications, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 441, 495, 508–
09 (2012); Miller, supra note 16, at 305, 366–67. With respect to protective legislation, raw
economic power untethered to any real policy basis probably looms larger. See, e.g., Branson,
supra note 114, at 24. This Article seeks to add a manifest failure to understand financial history
and macroeconomics to the list of factors offered to explain the facially inexplicable.
116. Justice Douglas predicted successful political attacks in the courts and through Congress
on private securities remedies in 1934. Douglas, supra note 70, at 525. He was profoundly
correct. See, e.g., In re Glenfed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1557 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The
driving force behind securities fraud suits filed to extract early settlements disproportionate to the
merits is the expectation that once plaintiffs get past the pleading stage, they will automatically
gain access to virtually unlimited discovery.”); In re Time Warner Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 263 (2d
Cir. 1993) (stating that securities plaintiffs use the litigation process to “extract[] undeserved
settlements” because defendants are faced with large costs of defense).
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Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, the Court dramatically
shortened the statute of limitations applicable to private claims under
Rule 10b-5.117 Before the Court’s decision in Gilbertson, the circuit
courts had looked to state law to define the statute of limitations for
claims under Rule 10b-5 for over forty years.118 Invariably, these
statutes of limitations were more generous to injured investors in terms
of the statutory periods in which claims must be brought. 119 This is
because the Supreme Court in Gilbertson basically engrafted a strict
liability, rescission-based statute of limitations upon a fraud-based
remedy.120
The Court struck again in 1994. In Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v.
First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., the Court eliminated aiding and
abetting liability in private actions under Rule 10b-5.121 Through aiding
and abetting liability, federal courts had historically permitted plaintiffs
to recover against those who aided or abetted the securities violations of
others.122 Common law fraud long recognized liability for those aiding
117. 501 U.S. 350, 360–62 (1991) (holding that the limitations period for 10b-5 claims is one
year from discovery, but in no event more than three years from the date of the transaction),
superseded by statute on other grounds, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236.
118. As Justice Stevens argued:
The policy choices that the Court makes today may well be wise—even though they
are at odds with the recommendation of the Executive Branch—but that is not a
sufficient justification for making a change in what was well-settled law during the
years between 1946 and 1988 governing the timeliness of action impliedly authorized
by a federal statute. This Court has recognized that a rule of statutory construction that
has been consistently applied for several decades acquires a clarity that “is simply
beyond peradventure.”
Id. at 368–69 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375,
380 (1983)).
119. Rescission is viewed as a harsh remedy because it unwinds transactions and upsets
business expectations. Consequently it makes sense that Congress would limit the rescission
remedy provided in section 12 of the Securities Acts. Another section where Congress imposed a
short one-year/three-year limitations regime is the strict liability imposed by section 18 of the
Exchange Act for false filings. See id. at 376 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy also
objected to an absolute statute of repose of three years because it “conflicts with traditional
limitations periods for fraud-based actions . . . and imposes severe . . . limitations on a federal
implied cause of action that has become an essential component of the protection the law gives to
investors who have been injured by unlawful practices.” Id. at 374.
120. Id. at 376. Congress partially repaired the damage of the courts with respect to the
statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. §1658(b) (2012). Unfortunately, more needs to be done.
Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Toward a Just Measure of Repose: The Statute of
Limitations for Sec. Fraud, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1547, 1611 (2011) (showing that the
pleading requirements of the PSLRA still create unjust statute of limitations issues for plaintiffs
and permit unremedied securities fraud).
121. 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994) (holding that aiding and abetting liability was not statutorily
authorized after thirty years of lower courts imposing such liability).
122. See, e.g., Farlow v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 956 F.2d 982, 986 (10th Cir. 1992);
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and abetting fraud.123 Recognition of aiding and abetting liability under
the federal securities laws was often crucial in imposing accountability
upon so-called “gatekeepers.”124 This enhances compensation by
providing investors with meaningful remedies against so-called “deep
pockets” such as lawyers or accountants; after all, the presence of such
professionals could well have advanced frauds perpetrated by
impecunious actors.125 Moreover, these professional “gatekeepers”
often could act to forestall massive securities fraud.126 Yet, once again,
the Court simply ignored decades of lower court rulings and
congressional acquiescence in those rulings and overturned decades of
pre-existing case law.127
In 1995, in Gustafson v. Alloyd, the Court restricted the availability of
rescission claims against sellers of securities under the Securities Act by
engrafting a requirement that a plaintiff in such an action be a purchaser
in a public offering.128 Importantly, section 12(2) does not require
proof of scienter.129 Lower courts long applied the plain meaning of the

Schlifke v. Seafirst Corp., 866 F.2d 935, 937 (7th Cir. 1989); Kerbs v. Fall River Indus. Inc., 502
F.2d 731, 739–40 (10th Cir. 1974), abrogated by Central Bank, 511 U.S. 164; Brennan v.
Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 680 (N.D. Ind. 1966), abrogated by Central
Bank, 511 U.S. 164.
123. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1977).
124. As used in this Article, the term “gatekeepers” includes: (1) auditors that act to verify a
company’s financial statements; (2) debt rating agencies that evaluate the creditworthiness of the
company; (3) investment bankers that issue fairness opinions or facilitate the distribution of
securities; and (4) attorneys that advise issuers or opine in connection with specific transactions.
Coffee, supra note 38, at 1405.
125. Noted scholars attribute the Enron series of corporate failures precisely to “gatekeeper”
failure. “Logically, as legal exposure to liability declines and as the benefits of acquiescence in
the client’s demands increase, gatekeeper failure should correspondingly increase—as it did in the
1990s.” Id. at 1419.
126.
Although other spectacular securities frauds have been discovered from time to time
over recent decades, they have not generally disturbed the overall market. In contrast,
Enron has clearly roiled the market and created a new investor demand for
transparency. Behind this disruption lies the market’s discovery that it cannot rely
upon the professional gatekeepers—auditors, analysts, and others—whom the market
has long trusted to filter, verify and assess complicated financial information. Properly
understood, Enron is a demonstration of gatekeeper failure, and the question it most
sharply poses is how this failure should be rectified.
Id. at 1403.
127. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 192–98 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128. 513 U.S. 561 (1995) (stating that when Congress enacted section 12(2) of the Securities
Act, it could not have intended to create “vast additional liabilities”).
129. Louis Loss, The Assault on Securities Act Section 12(2), 105 HARV. L. REV. 908, 911
(1992) (“[S]cienter (whatever it means) is alien to the language of section 12(2). Instead,
Congress shifted the burden of proof to the defendant to show that he ‘did not know, and in the
exercise of reasonable care could not have known,’ of the untruth or omission.”).
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statute to allow section 12(2) actions in a non-public offering.130
Moreover, as Justice Ginsburg argued in dissent, “[s]tate adaptations of
[section 12(2)] have been applied consistently beyond public offerings
[and] have been read to cover secondary transactions.”131 Justice
Ginsburg also demonstrated that securities law scholars (including
scholars involved in the drafting of the Securities Act or its early
implementation) clearly stated that they intended the section 12(2)
remedy to reach beyond public offerings.132 Professor Bainbridge
termed the Gustafson opinion “the most poorly-reasoned, blatantly
results-driven securities opinion in recent memory.”133 This decision
effectively granted additional protection to all sorts of securities
peddlers, and directly defies the policy of the Securities Act.134
In 2005, the Court ruled in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,135
that plaintiffs seeking to recover under the federal securities laws must
allege and prove “economic loss.”136 That requires an allegation that
the defendant’s misconduct did not merely touch upon the losses
suffered but proximately caused those losses.137 This in turn requires
130. E.g., Haralson v. E.F. Hutton Grp., Inc., 919 F.2d 1014, 1032 (5th Cir. 1990); Adalman
v. Baker, Watts & Co., 807 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1986); Nor-Tex Agencies v. Jones, 482 F.2d 1093,
1099 (5th Cir. 1973) (applying section 12 to non-public offering).
131. 513 U.S. at 613 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 600–01.
133. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Securities Act Section 12(2) After the Gustafson Debacle, 50
BUS. LAW. 1231, 1231 (1995).
134. Loss, supra note 129, at 908–09, 917.
135. 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
136. Id. at 343 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4)). More specifically,
As we have pointed out, the plaintiffs’ lengthy complaint contains only one statement
that we can fairly read as describing the loss caused by the defendants’ “spray device”
misrepresentations. That statement says that the plaintiffs “paid artificially inflated
prices for Dura[‘s] securities” and suffered “damage[s].” The statement implies that
the plaintiffs’ loss consisted of the “artificially inflated” purchase “prices.” The
complaint’s failure to claim that Dura’s share price fell significantly after the truth
became known suggests that the plaintiffs considered the allegation of purchase price
inflation alone sufficient.
Id. at 346–47 (internal citations omitted).
137. According to Justice Breyer:
But it should not prove burdensome for a plaintiff who has suffered an economic loss
to provide a defendant with some indication of the loss and the causal connection that
the plaintiff has in mind. At the same time, allowing a plaintiff to forgo giving any
indication of the economic loss and proximate cause that the plaintiff has in mind
would bring about harm of the very sort the statutes seek to avoid. It would permit a
plaintiff “with a largely groundless claim to simply take up the time of a number of
other people, with the right to do so representing an in terrorem increment of the
settlement value, rather than a reasonably founded hope that the [discovery] process
will reveal relevant evidence.”
Id. at 347 (citation omitted).
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linking the misrepresentations to the ultimate losses sustained.138 The
opinion is limited to claims brought by purchasers of securities who
pursue private securities fraud claims based on the fraud-on-the-market
theory,139 and therefore applies to a relatively narrow band of securities
fraud cases.140 Further, compliance with the essential teaching of the
case poses only mild pleading challenges.141 Nevertheless, it is a
perfect illustration of the hyper-technical road counsel must now tread
in order to avoid dismissal of a Rule 10b-5 action.142 Professor Michael
Kaufman has noted that this requirement of “economic loss” is not in
the legislation, nor in the legislative history underlying the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”), and “raises the specter of
result-oriented reasoning.”143
Worse, the Supreme Court expanded the protection for those aiding
and abetting securities fraud in Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. in 2008.144 After Central Bank, a majority of
lower courts held that primary securities fraud liability should be
narrowly imposed only upon those making direct or attributable
fraudulent statements.145 Stoneridge affirms this approach.146 As
Professor Prentice demonstrates convincingly, however, common law
138. Id.
139. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246–47 (1988) (holding that plaintiffs may rely
on the integrity of market prices). As Professor Kaufman explains, “fraud-on-the-market cases”
are Rule 10b-5 actions in which the “element of ‘reliance’ can be ‘nonconclusively’ presumed
from the fact that plaintiffs purchased their shares at a price that ‘reflects a material
misrepresentation.’” Michael J. Kaufman, At a Loss: Congress, the Supreme Court and
Causation Under the Federal Securities Laws, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1, 41 (2005).
140. Professor Kaufman states:
Accordingly, the decision does not address SEC actions, which are not at all governed
by the PSLRA. Nor does the opinion reach private actions for securities fraud where
the plaintiffs are not attempting to take advantage of the nonconclusive presumption of
reliance on the fraud-on-the-market theory. Examples include cases involving
securities not traded on a public market, cases involving claims of actual reliance on a
fraudulent misrepresentation, cases involving a presumption of reliance from a material
omission, and even cases involving a presumption of reliance from the “fraud - created
the-market” theory. Finally, and somewhat paradoxically, the Court’s decision does
not take into account any claims brought by defrauded sellers of securities who sell
their securities at artificially deflated prices.
Id. at 42.
141. Id. at 42–46.
142. See generally Branson, supra note 114, at 6 (discussing how the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts have radically changed a prior presumptive reliance on 10b-5 by determining many cases
for defendants and defense interests).
143. Kaufman, supra note 139, at 48–49.
144. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008).
145. See, e.g., Ziemba v. Cascade Int’l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1205 (11th Cir. 2001); Anixter v.
Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1223–27 (10th Cir. 1996).
146. 552 U.S. at 158–59.
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fraud always operated to impose liability on those participating in fraud
as direct fraudfeasors with no need to actually speak. 147 Prentice notes
that as a result of this reality the “Rule 10b-5 cause of action actually
provides markedly less protection than investors enjoyed before 1934,
rather than more.”148 This can only be termed a yet another perversion
of the original conception of the federal securities laws. As Professor
Prentice concludes: “The activist Stoneridge majority has . . . completed
its self-appointed task of largely eviscerating the private right to sue that
it began in Central Bank without any sufficient basis in law or policy
for doing so.”149 Dissenting, Justice Stevens spoke no less directly: “I
respectfully dissent from the Court’s continuing campaign to render the
private cause of action under §10(b) toothless.”150
Some commentators have noted that the Court had been scaling back
investor protections under the federal securities laws for decades even
prior to this series of cases that aggressively limited the scope of private
securities remedies under the federal securities laws. Professor Branson
catalogued the carnage as of 1996: “In forty federal securities law
decisions, the Court decided thirty-two cases for defendants and, in
almost every one, significantly narrowed the reach of federal securities
laws.”151 Today, the Court obviously seeks to abolish or at least
severely limit private securities fraud litigation.152
147.
When Congress legislated in 1934, the common law of fraud and virtually every
existing body of fraud jurisprudence imposed liability upon those who knowingly
participated in a fraud. It is nearly inconceivable that a Congress legislating in 1934
(or an SEC making rules in 1942) would have intended anything else for the broadly
drawn Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5.
Robert Prentice, Stoneridge, Securities Fraud Litigation and the Supreme Court, 45 AM. BUS.
L.J. 611, 622–23 (2008) (and authorities cited therein).
148. Id. at 612.
149. Id. at 675.
150. 552 U.S. at 174 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In the latest assault of that campaign, the Court
limited accountability under Rule 10b-5 (yet again) only to those exercising “ultimate authority”
over a fraudulent statement. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296,
2302 (2011).
151. Branson, supra note 114, at 6.
152. Incandela, supra note 30, at 938 (citing Janus and concluding that the Court holds an
“apparent desire to abolish the private right of action under § 10(b)”). During approximately the
same time the Court shifted its attitude regarding private enforcement of the federal securities
laws, it also led the charge against the retrenchment of public enforcement of the securities laws.
Thus, the SEC Historical Society notes on its website that the SEC emerged victorious from every
challenge to its authority in the Supreme Court from 1941 to 1971. SEC HISTORICAL SOC’Y,
Fair To All People: The SEC and the Regulation of Insider Trading, Counterattack From the
Supreme Court, http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/it/counterAttack_a.php (last
visited Mar. 10, 2014). Subsequently, the Court pared the SEC’s authority and challenged its
interpretation of the federal securities laws. Id. (citing A. C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell,
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In late 1995, Congress joined the campaign and enacted the
PSLRA.153 The PSLRA imposed a new, more stringent pleading
standard regarding scienter on plaintiffs seeking relief under the federal
securities laws even before discovery may commence; imposed a new
sanctions provision applying a loser-pays rule to such plaintiffs; created
a safe harbor for forward-looking frauds; restricted the ability of
plaintiffs to seek class action relief under the federal securities laws;
imposed a stricter statutory causation standard for private securities
litigants; and restricted the availability of joint and several liability for
such claimants.154 Collectively, these provisions gave securities
fraudfeasors wider shelter from private claims.
Yet, individually, the pleading standard imposed under the PSLRA
operates as the most pernicious and illogical element of the PSLRA. 155
The PSLRA requires all securities plaintiffs to plead scienter—that is,
intent to defraud—through “facts giving rise to a strong inference that
the defendant acted with the required state of mind.”156 Moreover,
these facts must be pled without the benefit of discovery. 157 The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) exemplify a far more
reasoned approach. FRCP 9(b) merely requires that while fraud must
be alleged with particularity, scienter may be alleged generally; this
means a plaintiff need not produce strong facts bearing on a defendant’s
state of mind before discovery, but instead must prove scienter to the
trier of fact.158 Recently, the Court addressed the meaning of a “strong

Jr. and the Counterrevolution in the Federal Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L. J. 841, 843–44 (2003)).
153. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
154. Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform, supra note 11, at 1084 (“The recent ‘reforms’ of
private securities litigation are a betrayal of several fundamental goals of the federal securities
laws and expose our financial system to risks that are not fully appreciated.”).
155. See, e.g., Curt Cutting, Turning Point for Rule 10b-5: Will Congressional Reforms
Protect Small Corporations, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 555, 583 (1995) (“Evidence indicating a
defendant’s state of mind is virtually impossible to discover without conducting [discovery].
Requiring plaintiffs to produce such evidence before discovery is ‘putting the cart before the
horse.’”); Charles W. Murdock, Corporate Corruption and the Complicity of Congress and the
Supreme Court—The Tortuous Path from Central Bank to Stoneridge Investment Partners, 6
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 131, 188 (2009) (“Congress and the federal courts are operating in a
fairyland world. Unless the accountants decide to recast the financial statements, or the board of
directors or a bankruptcy court initiates an investigation which is made public, or whistleblowers
are found, requiring specificity in pleading without discovery is an almost insurmountable
hurdle.”); see also Sale, supra note 38, at 578 (“[W]hen vigorously applied, the combination of a
strict pleading standard with a stay of discovery creates a pleading barrier so high that few
complaints will survive it.”); Weiss & Roser, supra note 38, at 500 (showing through a case study
that if courts fully enforce the PSLRA “much fraud will go unremedied”).
156. 15 U.S.C §78 u-4(b)(1) (2012).
157. See id. §§ 77z-1(b)(2), 78u-4(b)(3)(B).
158. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
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inference” under the PSLRA.159 According to the Court, that standard
is satisfied only if “a reasonable person would deem the inference of
[the required state of mind] cogent and at least as compelling as any
opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged.”160 In other
words, a plaintiff must rebut the possibility of an innocent
misrepresentation at the pleading stage, without the benefit of
discovery.
The PSLRA imposed a sanctions provision that applied only to
plaintiffs and approached a loser-pays regime for securities plaintiffs.161
The Act creates a rebuttable presumption that any finding of a FRCP
11162 violation with respect to a complaint (but not responsive pleadings
by defendants) entitles the defendant to “reasonable attorneys’ fees and
other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation.”163 Further,
Congress required courts to conduct a mandatory review as to whether
counsel violated Rule 11 at the conclusion of the litigation, and
deprived courts of the discretion to decline to impose sanctions even if a
Rule 11 violation occurs.164 Other than with respect to private
securities litigation, Rule 11 applies the same standards and procedures
with respect to all pleadings, and Rule 11 scrutiny is triggered only by
motion.165 This particularly harsh approach to sanctions for private
securities claims naturally chills all claims regardless of ultimate
merit.166
The PSLRA also abolishes joint and several liability in private
securities litigation except for knowing violations.167 As a result,
securities fraudfeasors will generally only be liable for an apportioned
159. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314, 324–26 (2007).
160. Id. at 324.
161. President Clinton cited the sanctions provision as a key basis for his veto of the PSLRA.
PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON, PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995—VETO
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 104-150 (1995). He
noted that the measures lacked balance and treated plaintiffs more harshly than defendants. Id.
The President also objected that the provision resembled a “loser-pays” approach that is contrary
to American tradition. Id.
162. FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
163. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c)(3)(a) (2012).
164. Id. § 78u-4(c)(1).
165. Id.
166. According to Professors Choi and Thompson:
Most of the sanctions cases occur in disputes between individual investors and their
broker or money manager in contexts far removed from the class action context that
generated the motivation for the passage of the PSLRA. These non-class action cases
generated a majority of the examples (seven cases) in which sanctions were imposed (a
total of eleven cases in our sample).
Choi & Thompson, supra note 28, at 1502.
167. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(2)(A).
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share of the total damages in their fraud causes, as determined by the
jury.168 This “reform” essentially shifts the risk of an insolvent or
judgment-proof defendant to the plaintiff from a co-defendant found
guilty of securities fraud.169 This provision came under immediate
attack since it only applies to meritorious claims—meaning it
specifically applies only to proven securities fraudfeasors to reduce their
exposure.170 Thus, this element of the PSLRA belies any claim that it
took aim only at frivolous claims.171 Clearly, the Act was simply prosecurities fraudfeasors.172 If there were a truth-in-legislating
requirement, the PSLRA would be called the Leave No Securities
Fraudfeasor Behind Act.
In 1998, Congress followed up on the PSLRA with the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (“SLUSA”).173 The SLUSA
168. Id. § 78u-4(f)(2)(B).
169. This provision transparently operates to simply favor securities fraudfeasors over
innocent securities investors. I catalogued the various and sundry mechanisms the judiciary and
Congress have put in place that incentivize securities fraud at the expense of compensation for
victims and deterrence in 1999. Thus, I highlighted the pleading rule that allowed potential
securities fraudfeasors to escape responsibility if alleged to have acted fraudulently in exchange
for professional fees or salaries. Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform, supra note 11, at 1070 n.60. I
also argued that courts had crafted a rule that no fraud can occur if it is forward-looking fraud that
“bespeaks caution.” Id. at 1071 n.61. I also wrote against the abolition of joint and several
liability. Id. at 1078. Each of these provisions simply amounts to a known subsidy for fraudulent
actors in the securities markets.
170. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Reform of Joint and Several Liability Under the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Proportionate Liability, Contribution Rights and
Settlement Effects, 51 BUS. LAW. 1157, 1174 (1996) (concluding that because this reform applies
to meritorious, non-class action claims, it is overbroad).
171. See, e.g., REPRESENTATIVE NEWT GINGRICH ET AL., CONTRACT WITH AMERICA 150
(Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994) (“Since class-action lawyers can make decisions that
are not in the best interest of the clients . . . shareholders are often exploited. Strike suits are
money-makers for the lawyers but such frivolous claims destroy jobs and hurt the economy.”). In
fairness, the PSLRA included many class action reforms that I do not criticize here. Ramirez,
Arbitration and Reform, supra note 11, at 1078–79. Similarly, the PSLRA included a safe harbor
for forward-looking frauds. Id. at 1076. This provision defies the historical bases of the federal
securities laws. See Joel Seligman, The Private Securities Reform Act of 1995, 38 ARIZ. L. REV.
717, 732 (1996) (“[The safe harbor provision] appears to go far, for the first time in the history of
federal securities laws, to immunize certain deliberately false statements.”). Yet, as will be
shown it played only a marginal role (at best) in the massive securities frauds of 2001–2002 and
the Great Financial Crisis of 2008. See infra Part II.
172. Early on, other commentators came to conclusion that the PSLRA was overbroad. See
Cutting, supra note 151, at 582 (“Like the fee shifting provision . . . the requirement that scienter
be pled with particularity disposes of meritorious claims as well as meritless ones.”); see also
John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding Road to the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 BUS. LAW. 335, 377–78 (1996) (“To the extent the
Act makes meritorious cases more difficult to pursue, it will not have served a worthwhile
purpose. The strength of our markets depends on investor confidence that those markets operate
honestly and fairly.”).
173. Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
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eliminated state class actions in securities disputes involving public
companies.174 For the first time in history, the federal securities laws
operated to narrow investor rights of action.175
This directly
undermines the longstanding ideal that the federal securities laws only
operate to enhance remedies available to investors. 176 As I stated
previously: “A more reactionary cycle could hardly have been imagined
by the promulgators of the federal securities laws in the early 1930s.”177
Professor Branson sums up the net effect of all of this: “[T]hey—
conservative federal judges, lobbyists for corporate American and other
defense interests and Congress—have joined together to destroy
completely the federal courts as places of refuge and protection for
defrauded investors.”178 Notably, he published his conclusion in 1996.
Since then, Congress piled on with the SLUSA and the Supreme Court
piled on with ever more draconian interpretations of Rule 10b-5.179
Both Congress and the courts simply ignore the history of massive
securities fraud and the basic economic logic that compels stemming
fraud in the financial markets.
There can be little doubt that all of this extreme effort to deter private
securities litigation affected the number of claims pursued and the
settlements paid (if any)—and therefore critically changed the
risk/reward relationship that drives individuals to commit securities
fraud.180 After the PSLRA, trials of securities fraud class actions
U.S.C.).
174. Id. After the SLUSA, federal law now operates to destroy state law private rights of
action. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006)
(holding that the SLUSA preempted class action relief for plaintiffs alleging fraudulent
inducement to hold securities and thereby destroyed such claims).
175. Historically, the federal securities laws had operated only to expand investor rights
because federal remedies were cumulative with any state law rights of recovery. See Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983) (stating that Congress enacted the federal
securities laws in order “to rectify perceived deficiencies in common law protections”).
176. See supra notes 78–81, 147 and accompanying text (explaining how federal remedies
collaborated with state remedies to enhance only the rights of investors).
177. Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform, supra note 11, at 1084.
178. Branson, supra note 114, at 40–41.
179. See supra notes 144, 159, 173 and accompanying text (citing the SLUSA and relevant
Supreme Court cases).
180. Fraud is a function of incentives and disincentives under law. Charles M. Yablon, A
Dangerous Supplement? Longshot Claims and Private Securities Litigation, 94 NW. U. L. REV.
567, 594–95 (2000). Today the law fails to adequately deter fraud. Id. at 596. Professor Yablon
recognized this fact early on, at the turn of the century, and proved prescient:
One further reason for not seeking additional curbs on . . . securities claims at this time
is that managerial incentives to engage in such fraudulent conduct may be increasing.
The reason for this may be stated in three words: pay for performance. In recent years,
most CEO compensation packages have become increasingly dependent on stock
performance, often stock performance within a limited period of time, like an options
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became a rarity and settlements amounted to only 2.1% of estimated
damages.181
Ironically, now that securities litigation suffered
evisceration at the hands of the judiciary and Congress, commentators
argue further restrictions are warranted because private litigation offers
neither compensation nor deterrence.182 Essentially, the argument is
that now that Congress and the judiciary gave a green light to securities
fraud, we should lift the speed limit.
This war on private securities litigation did not proceed openly on the
basis that law should operate to destroy the economy, enrich a small
band of powerful securities fraudfeasors, and permit mass fleecing of
investors worldwide. Instead, it relied upon policy props that all held
that private securities litigation caused great harm.183 One prop was the
mythological litigation explosion.184 Another prop was the “urban
legend” of the extortionate settlement.185 A third prop argued that too

exercise period. This may not be a bad thing, but it has certainly increased the
incentives of corporate managers to control or delay the flow of bad news to the
securities markets. Given this trend, now seems a particularly bad time to weaken or
remove one of the major disincentives to such conduct.
Id.; see also JOHN C. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
61 (2006) (noting that, after the PSLRA was passed, “class-action plaintiffs virtually ceased suing
secondary defendants”). Of course, resort to numbers of claims filed since the PSLRA to assess
its impact is likely futile, as the key number that matters is unknowable—the number of claims
chilled and not pursued due to the draconian “reforms” to the law for the benefit of fraudfeasors.
More importantly, if the PSLRA facilitated more securities fraud then the raw number of claims
pursued as a measure of the impact of the so-called reforms is confounded by the reality of more
securities fraud.
181. RENZO COMOLLI ET AL., NERA ECON. CONSULTING, RECENT TRENDS IN SECURITIES
CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: 2012 FULL-YEAR REVIEW 39 (2012), available at
http://www.nera.com/67_7992.htm; CORNERSTONE SETTLEMENTS 2011, supra note 110, at 7, 8.
182. See, e.g., Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the
Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301,
1306 (2008) (arguing that to avoid over-deterrence the SEC should have pre-clearance authority
over private complaints without any assessment of the possible macroeconomic harm wrought by
massive securities fraud).
183. See Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform, supra note 11, at 1055 (summarizing
commentators’ attacks on private securities litigation).
184. E.g., Stephen S. Meinhold & David W. Neubauer, Exploring Attitudes About the
Litigation Explosion, 22 JUST. SYS. J. 105, 112 (2001) (“[T]he myth of the litigation explosion
continues to be widely held and appears to be permanently entrenched”); Jack B. Weinstein, After
Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the Barriers to Justice Being Raised?,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1909 (1989) (questioning the existence of a litigation explosion and
noting that federal judges have about the same number of cases as in 1960); see also supra note
36.
185. John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and
its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1536 n.5 (2006) (comparing extortionate
settlements to a “unicorn”); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play
on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 103 (2010) (“[C]laims of excessive
costs, abuse, and frivolousness in litigation may have much less substance than many think, and
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much frivolous litigation imposed a tax upon capital formation holding
back economic growth.186 None of these props holds any true policy
validity.187 Yet, these essential arguments provided crucial political
cover for the true purpose of the war—to allow corporate and financial
elites to garner enhanced profits from fraud-related activities without
concern for possible accountability.188 As the next Part demonstrates,
that was the predictable effect of the indulgences granted securities
fraudfeasors during the war on private securities litigation.189
II. THE ERA OF MASSIVE SECURITIES FRAUD
Persistent scandals following the war on private securities litigation,
such as the failure of Enron and other high profile firms in 2001–2002,
demonstrate that fraudfeasors can now too easily line their pockets at
the expense of shareholders and general financial stability.190 Enron

extortionate settlements may be but another urban legend.”). As Professor Miller later explained,
it is virtually impossible to identify or measure the reality or frequency of any extortionate
settlement. Miller, Simplified Pleading, supra note 16, at 362.
186. Hufford, supra note 114, at 641. Of course excessive, theoretical, random and arbitrary
litigation may tax innovation and suppress growth. Yet, the counterpoint (based in actual reality)
is that investors shun financial markets tainted with massive securities fraud, as occurred during
the Great Depression. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. Today, experts attribute the
disappearance of the retail investor to a host of factors including Wall Street scandals. Barry
Ritholtz, Where has the retail investor gone?, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 2012,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/where-has-the-retail-investor-gone/2012/08/17/9a915
eee-e7cf-11e1-936a-b801f1abab19_story.html (“[P]eople believe the game is rigged against
them. They aren’t conspiracy nuts, they are merely observing what has been going on . . . . [I]t
appears that bankers have corrupted the political process for their own gains. Investors are
wondering why they should participate in such an absurd environment.”).
187. See Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform, supra note 11, at 1086–89.
188. The FCIC found that a “systemic breakdown in accountability and ethics” formed a root
cause of the crisis. FCIC REPORT, supra note 114, at xxii. The millions in compensation
garnered from such misconduct boggles the mind. Id. at 61–63. The massive lobbying and
campaign contributions behind the war on securities litigation came from the very interests that
profited mightily from a free-wheeling financial sector—financial elites. Id. at xviii.
189. Scholars in various fields increasingly show what has long been obvious—that legal
indulgences for securities fraudfeasors produces more fraud. Thus, one innovative study that
exploited legal differences among circuits in the degree of laxity extended to securities fraud
defendants showed that more laxity means more fraud. Justin Hopkins, Market-Based
Regulation: Does Securities Litigation Prevent Financial Misrepresentations? 4–5 (Aug. 23,
2013) (unpublished and unnumbered working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=18
72068 (finding that a court decision that reduced the risk of fraud claims led to more financial
restatements and earnings management, especially among firms facing a higher risk of litigation).
In another innovative study of the impact of the PSLRA business scholars found more
questionable accounting outcomes for large accounting firms most likely affected by the PSLRA
relative to those less likely subject to the protections of the PSLRA. See Lee & Mande, supra
note 11, at 93.
190. Douglas Guerrero, The Root of Corporate Evil, INTERNAL AUDITOR, Dec. 2004, at 37
(stating that, with regard to the corporate failures of 2001–2002, “highly placed executives used

RAMIREZ.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

The Virtues of Private Securities Litigation

4/1/2014 10:47 PM

701

became the prime example: in the end, Enron’s Chief Executive Officer
(“CEO”), Chairman of the Board and Chief Financial Officer were
indicted and convicted of securities fraud (or at least found guilty by a
jury).191 Nevertheless, before their convictions, the three received
nearly $500 million in aggregate compensation.192
Essentially, Enron’s senior managers used accounting fraud to hide
losses and debts in special purpose entities (“SPEs”)193 that should have
been consolidated under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(“GAAP”) with Enron’s financial statements (and disclosed in Enron’s
Form 10-K).194 Enron valued other derivatives trades pursuant to “rosy
assumptions” under fair value accounting permissible under GAAP.195
The temporary result of this securities fraud was to enhance accounting
performance.196 The effective result was that Enron’s senior managers
greatly enriched themselves at great loss to shareholders.197 The
problem with all of this accounting chicanery is that it makes it
impossible for shareholders to understand their own corporations and

their power . . . to achieve financial targets fraudulently, boost the stock price, and further enrich
themselves via compensation schemes that rewarded those achievements”).
191. Scott Cohn, Fastow: Enron Didn’t Have to Go Bankrupt, CNBC (June 26, 2013, 9:24
PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100847519 (noting that while Fastow and Skilling served years in
prison, Ken Lay’s conviction was set aside due to his reported death before sentencing).
192. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE ROARING NINETIES 242 (2003).
193. As Professor Cunningham explains: “The company engaged in volatile trading activity
and housed it in special purpose entities (SPEs) to insulate the company’s earnings and hence
stock price from resulting short-term gyrations. Using SPEs is legitimate and lawful as matters of
accounting and commercial and securities laws, so long as rules are observed.” LAWRENCE A.
CUNNINGHAM, INTRODUCTORY ACCOUNTING, FINANCE AND AUDITING FOR LAWYERS 440 (6th
ed. 2013).
194. Under GAAP accounting:
To obtain off-balance treatment, SPEs must satisfy general well-known rules of
consolidation accounting and particular arcane rules applied to these entities. The
general rule provides that to avoid full consolidation of an entity, a third-party must
control a majority of that entity’s equity . . . ; the arcane rule says that at least 3% of
the SPE’s total capital must be equity (capping the debt equity ratio at approximately
97:3 or about 32:1). In early transactions, Enron followed both rules, capitalizing SPEs
with a debt: equity ratio no greater than 32:1 and placing a majority of the equity with
a third party. In subsequent deals, however, one or both requirements went unmet. In
most of these, either Enron, an affiliate or an Enron executive held the equity. This
meant that all the deals constituted related-party transactions and all should have been
disclosed and/or consolidated on Enron’s books. None was. Debt housed in these
controlled entities ran to billions of dollars, and the security was often Enron’s own
stock. When business conditions turned adverse, its stock price weakened and the
debts came home to roost in cascades, leading to bankruptcy.
Id. at 441.
195. Id.
196. STIGLITZ, supra note 192, at 243.
197. Id.
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make decisions accordingly.198
When Enron collapsed, the carnage was widespread. First, at the
time, Enron held the dubious title of being the largest bankruptcy in
history, meaning shareholders essentially were wiped out.199 Second,
numerous gatekeepers allegedly participated in the Enron fraud,
including Arthur Anderson,200 JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup and Enron’s
law firm, Vinson & Elkins,201 all of which faced legal sanctions. Third,
from a macroeconomic perspective, the failure of Enron could not have
come at a worse time, as the first revelations of deception arose on
October 16, 2001, as the nation was in the grips of recession that started
in March of 2001,202 and just over a month after the terrorist attacks of
September 11.203 Finally, Enron proved to be the beginning of a crisis
rather than the end.204

198. The entire purpose of the public accounting system is to provide an accurate depiction of
a firm’s financial condition and performance for end users of financial statements including
investors in securities. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 193, at 11.
199. According to NBC News:
Enron plummeted into bankruptcy proceedings in December 2001 amid revelations of
hidden debt, inflated profits and accounting tricks. Jurors determined after a 16-week
trial that both Lay and Skilling repeatedly lied to investors and employees about the
company’s health when they knew their optimism masked fraud. The collapse
obliterated more than $60 billion in market value, almost $2.1 billion in pension plans
and, initially, 5,600 jobs.
Enron sentences will be tied to investor losses, NBC NEWS (May 26, 2006, 6:38 PM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/12993408/#.UpR1ieKzL0c.
200. Andersen warrants special comment. The longstanding accounting firm held a wellearned reputation for integrity. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 193, at 440. Nevertheless, the lure of
easy money from consulting for Enron appears to have distracted it from its auditing role. The
truth on this point will never be known for certain because the firm shredded massive amounts of
documents once the SEC began to investigate. Id. This led to the obstruction of justice
conviction that ultimately sunk Andersen. Id.
201. STIGLITZ, supra note 192, at 242.
202. Id. at 58–62 (linking “irrational exuberance” in equity markets (including Enron bubble)
to the recession of 2001).
203. Cohn, supra note 191.
On October 16, 2001, Enron announced a $618 million quarterly loss, most of it
resulting from a one-time charge for terminating “certain structured finance
arrangements.” Those arrangements, known as the Raptors, allowed Enron to move
liabilities off of its books and into a series of Fastow-controlled partnerships known as
LJM. The vehicles were backed by Enron stock, which was already losing value.
Id.
204. “The proportion of listed companies on NYSE, Amex and NASDAQ identified as
restating their financial reports tripled from 0.89 percent in 1997 to 2.5 percent in 2001 . . . .
From January 1997 through June 2002, about 10 percent of all listed companies announced at
least one restatement.” U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-138, FINANCIAL STATEMENT
RESTATEMENTS: TRENDS, MARKET IMPACTS, REGULATORY RESPONSES, AND REMAINING
CHALLENGES 4 (2002), available at .http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03138.pdf. Further, the
average size of the firm restating their financial results quadrupled (measured by market
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Following the Enron fraud case, a series of accounting frauds
ultimately emerged.205 The most massive fraud disclosure also
constituted the most massive bankruptcy, outdoing even Enron.206
Specifically, in summer of 2002, telecommunications giant WorldCom
entered into, what was then, the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history. 207
WorldCom’s accounting fraud was far more primitive and basic than
Enron’s.208 They simply booked expenses as assets.209 WorldCom
booked $7 billion they paid for access to local phone lines and claimed
the expense as an asset.210 Previously, WorldCom booked these
expenses properly. When the improper accounting treatment was
challenged internally the whistleblower met with dismissal.211 After
WorldCom failed, investor fears surged and credit tightened.212 The
stock market plunged.
Understandably, investors lost confidence and fled the securities
markets. In one forty-eight hour period the Dow Jones Industrial
Average lost 700 points.213 In October 2002, the stock market reached
a five-year low.214 Total market value declined by $8 trillion and the
country fell into recession.215 This was the toll exacted upon the U.S.
economy by the “devastating debacle” of Enron and the parade of other
accounting scandals.216 Economists generally agree today that the
Enron series of frauds contributed to the recession in 2001 and retarded
capitalization). Id. Thus, accounting irregularities reached epidemic proportions by 2002.
205. Steven A. Ramirez, Fear and Social Capitalism: The Law and Macroeconomics of
Investor Confidence, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 31, 32 (2002) [hereinafter Ramirez, Fear and Social
Capitalism] (“Merck, Bristol-Myers Squib, Qwest, Xerox and others added to the drumbeat of
scandals.”).
206. Luisa Beltran, WorldCom files largest bankruptcy ever, CNNMONEY (July 22, 2002,
10:35 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2002/07/19/news/worldcom_bankruptcy (“WorldCom, the
nation’s No. 2 long-distance phone company, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection late
Sunday, nearly one month after it revealed that it had improperly booked $3.8 billion in
expenses.”).
207. Id.
208. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 193, at 443 (“Treating operating expenses as a capital
expense is an age old move . . . .”).
209. Id. at 442.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 442–43.
212. Gregory Zuckerman, Despite Rebound, Fears of Corporate Credit Crunch Linger, WALL
ST. J., July 25, 2002, at C1 (stating that investor fears are manifest in the degree of spread
between corporate debt and zero-risk U.S. Treasury obligations; investors in 2002 were
demanding greater yields, thereby expanding spreads and threatening a “much-feared credit
crunch”).
213. Ramirez, Fear and Social Capitalism, supra note 205, at 31.
214. KOZMETSKY & YUE, supra note 15, at 2.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1–2.
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the slow recovery that followed.217 Certainly, many factors contributed
to the recession of 2001, including the 9/11 terrorist attacks.218
Nevertheless, for the first time since the Great Depression massive
securities fraud played a key role in an American recession.219
Congress responded to the Enron crisis with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 (“SOX”).220 SOX focused primarily on limiting the ability of
the CEO to subvert or manipulate the audit function.221 SOX mandated
independent audit committees.222 It provided that auditors for public
firms report to and be accountable to the independent audit
committee.223 SOX provided a specific, if modest, definition of
“independent.”224 It created an entirely new regulator for auditors of
public companies.225 Finally, public firms226 must have one audit
committee member with specific accounting expertise (or an
explanation regarding the lack of financial expertise).227 All of this

217. Economists now attribute much of the losses in employment during the 2001 recession to
earnings management and accounting fraud at firms like Enron. See Kedia Simi & Thomas
Philippon, The Economics of Fraudulent Accounting, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 2169, 2169 (2009)
(“We show that during periods of suspicious accounting, firms hire and invest excessively, while
managers exercise options. When the misreporting is detected, firms shed labor and capital and
productivity improves.”).
218. Kevin L. Kliesen, The 2001 Recession: How Was It Different and What Developments
May Have Caused It?, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV., Sept./Oct. 2002, at 23, 31 (“[T]he 2001
recession was also notable for the sharp decline in exports and business investment in structures
and inventories. Further, the declines in business capital spending were probably magnified by
the sharp declines in equity prices during the recession, which helped to raise firms’ financial cost
of capital.”).
219. See KOZMETSKY & YUE, supra note 15, at 1 (noting that other significant recessions after
WWII were caused by oil price shocks in the mid-1970s and the early 1980s); see also
Zuckerman, supra note 212 (detailing how securities fraud has influenced the recession).
220. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and
29 U.S.C.).
221. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2012) (detailing the audit requirements).
222. Id. § 78j-1(m)(3)(A).
223. Id. §§ 78j-1(k), (m)(2).
224. Id. § 78j-1(m)(3)(B).
225. Id. §§ 101–109; id. §§ 7221–7219 (creating the “Public Accounting Oversight Board” to
regulate audit firms of public companies).
226. Publicly held companies are: (1) those companies or corporations traded on a national
securities exchange such as the New York Stock Exchange; and (2) those with 500 or more
shareholders and $10 million or more in assets. Id. § 781(g) (stating statutory definition of public
company); 17 C.F.R. § 12g-1 (2013) (SEC exemption for certain companies). Public
corporations are the central economic institution in the U.S., as they command a total market
capitalization of $19 trillion. See Fundamental Characteristics of the Wilshire 5000, WILSHIRE,
http://web.wilshire.com/Indexes/Broad/Wilshire5000/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2013). As such, they
are the primary store of investment capital in the U.S.
227. 15 U.S.C. § 7265. The SEC promulgated regulations implementing this section. See 17
C.F.R. §§ 228, 229, 249.

RAMIREZ.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

The Virtues of Private Securities Litigation

4/1/2014 10:47 PM

705

effectively stripped the CEO of autonomy over the audit function.228
Yet, despite the manifest flaws in the anti-fraud legal framework,
Congress did little to restore private claims for securities law violations
to the past.229 In particular, SOX did nothing to address auditor
liability, meaning that auditors would still lack incentives to interfere
with management efforts to achieve high compensation through fraud.
The compensation package that often led to the highest payouts, that
is, the option plan, created perverse incentives at the pinnacle of the
public corporation in America.230 These incentives encouraged officers
to fraudulently manipulate and inflate their share prices.231 Thus, many
commentators suggest that the series of corporate scandals were at
bottom driven by perverse compensation incentives.232 According to
respected business leadership voices, these incentives operated to create
a historic crisis in investor confidence that had macroeconomic
significance.233 Simply put, the war on securities fraud litigation
materially contributed to the macroeconomic instability arising from the
failure of Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Global Crossing and others during
2001–2002.234
In the fall of 2005, more evidence emerged that the law failed to deter
securities fraud. Refco was the largest independent futures broker in the

228. Although this removal of CEO autonomy was met with some success, CEOs simply used
their power to manipulate risk within the public firm to achieve excess compensation, as will be
discussed below. See Raghuram Rajan, Bankers’ Pay Is Deeply Flawed, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 9,
2008,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/18895dea-be06-11dc-8bc9-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz2vVK
gVB2K (noting the incentives for CEOs and financial managers to tolerate excessive risks that
increase short term returns in order to receive immediate compensation).
229. Congress extended the statute of limitations for securities fraud. More specifically,
section 804(a) of Sarbanes-Oxley amended 28 USC § 1658(b) to provide for a two year statute of
limitations and a statute of repose of five years.
230. See Douglas Guerrero, The Root of Corporate Evil: Executive Compensation Plans and
Overwhelming Authority Must be Controlled Through Better Governance Mechanisms,
INTERNAL AUDITOR, Dec. 2004, at 37 (suggesting, “[i]t appears that . . . highly placed executives
used their power . . . to achieve financial targets fraudulently, boost the stock price, and further
enrich themselves via compensation schemes that rewarded those achievements”).
231. Id.
232. See Federal Reserve Board’s Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress:
Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs (2002) (testimony of Chairman
Alan Greenspan), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/hh/2002/July/testimony
.htm (stating that lax boards had contributed to a CEO-centric corporate power structure that
permitted senior executives to “harvest” gains through manipulation of share prices).
233. THE CONFERENCE BD., COMMISSION ON PUBLIC TRUST AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 4, 6
(2003) (finding that excessive compensation, resulting in part from lax monitoring by boards, led
to an “unprecedented” loss of investor confidence).
234. Seligman, supra note 15, at 112–15 (identifying lax state fiduciary standards, along with
the PSLRA, as key legal elements underlying the corporate scandals of 2001–2002).
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U.S.235 Its CEO concealed $430 million in debts that he owed Refco
through entities he controlled, leading to his indictment for securities
fraud.236 The Refco public offering would have triggered the full
applicability of the SOX, but only after the company consummated its
public offering.237 The SEC had regulatory authority over the Refco
public offering and its securities brokerage units.238 Grant Thornton
audited the firm’s books in accordance with the new Sarbanes-Oxley
regime governing audits of public firms.239 Numerous underwriters and
other professionals (including the attorneys) would have been subject to
the “due diligence” requirements of the federal securities laws.240 Still,
despite all of this oversight, millions in debts owed by the firm’s CEO
were not discovered until after the public offering. 241 One expert
concluded that “[t]here is no way you can rely on an auditor or an
investment bank for a seal of approval or a guarantee of no
chicanery . . . . The lesson to be learned from Refco is that you must do
sleuth work yourself.”242
The options backdating scandals that came to light in 2006 proved far
worse. 243 Thousands of public corporations backdated options grants
to past dates when their stock was trading lower to maximize payoffs to
their senior executives.244 The sheer pervasiveness of the wrongdoing

235. Peter Robison, Bennett’s Refco Scheme Exposed by Late-Night Hunch: “It Hit Me”
(Correct), BLOOMBERG.COM (Oct. 31, 2005), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=new
sarchive&refer&sid=aNbiVOYM8VMA; see Steven A. Ramirez, The Chaos of Smith, 45
WASHBURN L.J. 343, 359 (2005).
236. Ramirez, supra note 235, at 359.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. (citing Emily Thornton, Refco: The Reckoning, BUS. WK. ONLINE (Nov. 7, 2005),
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_45/b3958095.htm (quoting veteran money
manager Michael F. Holland)); see id. (quoting Professor John Coffee) (“[O]ur current system of
due diligence by underwriters seems to be dysfunctional.”).
243. See M.P. Narayanan et al., The Economic Impact of Backdating of Executive Stock
Options, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1597, 1601 (2007) (finding that backdated options at forty-eight
sampled companies resulted in approximately $500,000 in extra compensation for executives
while costing shareholders at each company $389 million in market capitalization). “Recent
research has established that many executives exert both legal and illegal influence over their
compensation.” Id. at 1641.
244. Stephanie Saul, Study Finds Backdating of Options Widespread, N.Y. TIMES, July 17,
2006, at C1 (reporting on an academic study finding “[m]ore than 2,000 companies appear to
have used backdated stock options to sweeten their top executives’ pay packages”); see also
Randall A. Heron & Erik Lie, Does Backdating Explain the Stock Price Pattern Around
Executive Stock Option Grants?, 83 J. FIN. ECON. 271, 276 (2006) (describing an example of the
popularity of backdating by noting that the SEC found that one Silicon Valley firm had forty-nine
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sounded yet more alarms of a fundamentally flawed system of securities
regulation.245 Once again, CEOs lined their pockets through fraud and
imposed huge deadweight losses upon shareholders.246 By the end of
the summer of 2006, two criminal cases had been filed against
executives at Brocade Communications and Comverse Technology and
over 100 companies disclosed that their options practices were under
investigation.247 Rigging options grants to maximize payoffs is like
“stealing [money] from the company and . . . shareholders.”248 One
company backdated options grants to enrich a dead executive.249 Law
did not operate to deter this episode of massive securities fraud.250
Perhaps the greatest securities fraud in history operated in the run-up
to the Great Financial Crisis of 2008.251 For example, Countrywide
instances of backdating between January 1996 and April 2002); Randall A Heron & Erik Lie,
What Fraction of Stock Option Grants to Top Executive have been Backdated or Manipulated?,
55 MGMT. SCI. 513, 524 (2009) (“We . . . estimate that 29.2% of firms at some point engaged in
manipulation of grants to top executives between 1996 and 2005.”).
245. See Charles Forelle & James Bandler, Matter of Timing: Five More Companies Show
Questionable Options Pattern, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2006, at A1 (quoting former SEC Chair
Arthur Levitt) (suggesting options backdating is essentially “stealing” through the use of
fabricated documents, unless fully disclosed).
246. M.P. Narayanan et al., supra note 243, at 1641 (“[O]ur evidence suggests that managerial
theft is not a zero-sum game, but involves huge dead-weight losses for the shareholders.”).
247. Editorial, Phantom of the Options, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com
/2006/08/24/opinion/24thu2.html?_r=0.
248. Carolyn Said, Possible Options Scams at Several Local Companies, S.F. CHRON., May
24,
2006,
http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Possible-options-scams-at-several-localcompanies-2496290.php (quoting compensation expert Fred Whittlesey).
249. Peter Grant et al., Cablevision Gave Backdated Grant To Dead Official, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 22, 2006, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB115884346082669986.
250. On the contrary, former SEC Chair Arthur Levitt has termed options backdating to be
“the ultimate in greed.” Forelle & Bandler, supra note 245.
251. I use the term “Great Financial Crisis of 2008” to denote the massive global financial
market disruption that commenced with the failure of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008
and ending in the spring of 2009 when the U.S. stock market hit a low of below 7000 in the Dow
Jones Industrial Average. See Alexandra Twin, For Dow, Another 12-year Low, CNNMONEY
.COM (Mar. 9, 2008), http://money.cnn.com/2009/03/09/markets/markets_newyork/ (noting that
Dow closed at 6547, only 57% of the 2007 high). As both the current Federal Reserve Chair and
his immediate predecessor recognize this reflects the unprecedented virulence of the financial
crisis that struck the nation in the fall of 2008. See supra note 2 (comparing the Great Depression
with the Great Financial Crisis of 2008). Indeed, the financial shock to our economic system
rivals and may exceed the shock that led to the Great Depression. Only massive fiscal and
monetary stimulus spared the nation from an economic collapse like the Great Depression. ALAN
S. BLINDER & MARK ZANDI, HOW THE GREAT RECESSION WAS BROUGHT TO AN END 1 (July
27, 2010), available at https://www.economy.com/mark-zandi/documents/end-of-great-recession
.pdf (stating that “the U.S. government’s response to the financial crisis and ensuing Great
Recession included some of the most aggressive fiscal and monetary policies in history” and
finding that “its effects on real GDP, jobs, and inflation are huge, and probably averted what
could have been called Great Depression 2.0”). Thus, the “Great Financial Crisis of 2008”
focuses appropriately upon the magnitude of the financial disruption notwithstanding the fact that
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Financial originated, serviced and packaged more subprime loans than
any other firm.252 Countrywide engaged in reprehensible lending
practices; in fact, ultimately Countrywide settled allegations of
predatory lending asserted by eleven states for over $8 billion, the
largest such settlement in history.253
The states alleged that
Countrywide lied about its “no closing cost loans,” misled consumers
with respect to hidden fees, structured loans with risky features, paid
brokers more to sell more risky loans and frequently lent based upon
inflated borrowers’ income (without borrower involvement).254 The
New York Times interviewed former employees255 that corroborated
(and documented) many of these allegations.256 The profits generated
through lax lending standards and high fees were so high that
Countrywide continued its reckless257 lending even after delinquency
rates soared.258 “As such, the company is Exhibit A for the lax and,
until recently, highly lucrative lending that has turned a once-hot
business ice cold and has touched off a housing crisis of historic
proportions.”259
Angelo Mozilo, the firm’s CEO, garnered outrageous compensation
for leading Countrywide into the subprime pit.260 In 2006, Mozilo’s

the government successfully rescued the nation from a repeat of the Great Depression.
252. David Olive, Corporate Rewards for Failure, THESTAR.COM (Feb. 1, 2008), http://www
.thestar.com/columnists/article/299415 (reporting that Countrywide’s CEO sold $400 million in
stock between 2005 and 2008).
253. Gretchen Morgenson, Countrywide to Set Aside $8.4 Billion in Loan Aid, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 6, 2008, at B1.
254. Id.
255. Gretchen Morgenson, Inside the Countrywide Lending Spree, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26,
2007, at B1 (“Such loans were made, former employees say, because they were so lucrative—to
Countrywide. The company harvested a steady stream of fees or payments on such loans and
busily repackaged them as securities to sell to investors.”).
256. Id. (“One document, for instance, shows that until last September the computer system in
the company’s subprime unit excluded borrowers’ cash reserves, which had the effect of steering
them away from lower-cost loans to those that were more expensive to homeowners and more
profitable to Countrywide.”).
257. Id. (“The company would lend even if the borrower had been 90 days late on a current
mortgage payment twice in the last 12 months, if the borrower had filed for personal bankruptcy
protection, or if the borrower had faced foreclosure or default notices on his or her property.”).
258. Id. (“One reason these loans were so lucrative for Countrywide is that investors who
bought securities backed by the mortgages were willing to pay more for loans with prepayment
penalties and those whose interest rates were going to reset at higher levels.”).
259. Id. (“[T]he profit margins Countrywide generated on subprime loans that it sold to
investors were 1.84 percent, versus 1.07 percent on prime loans. A year earlier, when the
subprime machine was really cranking, sales of these mortgages produced profits of 2 percent,
versus 0.82 percent from prime mortgages.”).
260. James L. Bicksler, The Subprime Mortgage Debacle and Its Linkages to Corporate
Governance, 5 INT’L J. DISCLOSURE & GOVERNANCE 295, 296 (2008).
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compensation amounted to $102 million, which included a bonus of
$20.5 million for increased earnings at Countrywide from $4.11 per
share in 2005 to $4.62 per share in 2006.261 In 2007, Mozilo exercised
stock options, hauling in $127 million, just prior to the announcement
on July 24, 2007 that Countrywide would write down $388 million in
loan losses.262 Mozilo earned an additional $102 million in salary and
$30 million in options compensation in 2007.263 He retired in 2008
with a $58 million benefit.264 According to his own emails, Mozilo
knew that Countrywide’s loan products were “poison,” and he called the
risky loans the most “toxic” he had seen in all his years in home
lending.265 For the entire year of 2007, Countrywide lost $704 million,
as 33% of its subprime mortgages were delinquent.266 Shareholders lost
over 80% of the value of their shares, relative to their value before the
credit crisis.267 Countrywide was acquired by Bank of America—
where its subprime portfolio inflicted $33 billion in additional loan
losses according to one analyst.268 Mozilo and other Countrywide
executives settled securities fraud claims with the SEC for $73 million
in 2010 for failure to disclose Countrywide’s reckless lending.269
Angelo Mozilo paid just $22.5 million, or a small fraction of his
fraudulent (according to the SEC) profits.270
Citigroup’s CEO Chuck Prince famously stated in 2007 that if
liquidity dried up “things will be complicated” but that “as long as the

261. Id.
262. Id. at 297.
263. Id. at 296–97.
264. Id. at 297.
265. FCIC REPORT, supra note 114, at 20.
266. Roddy Boyd, Countrywide: From Bad to Worse, CNNMONEY.COM (Jan. 8, 2008),
http://money.cnn.com/2008/01/29/news/companies/boyd_countrywide.fortune/.
267. Bank of America and Countrywide: Fingers Crossed, ECONOMIST, June 28, 2008, at 82.
268. Bank of America Faces Lingering Financial Woes from Countrywide: Report,
MARKETWATCH (Feb. 8, 2009), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/bank-america-faces-lingerin
g-financial-woes.
269. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Former Countrywide CEO Angelo Mozilo to
Pay SEC’s Largest-Ever Financial Penalty Against a Public Company’s Senior Executive (Oct.
15, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-197.htm (noting that the SEC
settled based upon allegations that Mozilo (and others) “failed to disclose to investors the
significant credit risk that Countrywide was taking on as a result of its efforts to build and
maintain market share” and that “Mozilo engaged in insider trading in the securities of
Countrywide by establishing four 10b5-1 sales plans in October, November, and December 2006
while he was aware of material, non-public information concerning Countrywide’s increasing
credit risk”).
270. Walter Hamilton & E. Scott Reckard, Angelo Mozilo, Other Former Countrywide Execs
Settle Fraud Charges, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/16
/business/la-fi-mozilo-sec-20101016.
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music is playing you’ve got to get up and dance.”271 Citigroup worked
to keep the music playing by including “liquidity puts” in its securitized
pools of subprime mortgages it sold to investors.272 The liquidity put
required Citigroup to repurchase interests in subprime mortgages in the
event of turbulence in the subprime market.273 In the fall of 2007,
Citigroup learned that its subprime exposure amounted to about half of
its total capital, but concealed these facts from the investing public.274
Only in November of 2007 did Citigroup publicly disclose for the first
time that it had $55 billion in subprime mortgage exposure and
anticipated losses of about $8 billion to $11 billion.275 Prince resigned
shortly thereafter.276 In December of 2007, Citigroup announced it
would assume $58 billion of debts that had been carried by structured
investment vehicles (“SIVs”) it had sponsored; the SIVs had invested in
long-term assets (including mortgage related assets) with short term
funding.277
The risks of these losses went undisclosed to
shareholders.278
Ultimately, the U.S. government was forced to bail out Citigroup,
injecting $45 billion in capital and guaranteeing $306 billion in asset
values.279 During 2007, Citigroup’s shareholders lost 45% of their
value.280 Its stock traded at $55 per share in 2006, and in early 2009, it
traded at less than $4 per share.281 Later, its shares traded at below $1
per share.282 CEO Chuck Prince fared much better: his compensation
amounted to $66.8 million over his last three years and he was paid a

271. David Wighton, Prince of Wisdom, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s
/0/fce88e10-8b12-11dc-95f7-0000779fd2ac.html.
272. Carol J. Loomis, Robert Rubin on the Job He Never Wanted, FORTUNE, Nov. 26, 2007, at
69.
273. Id.
274. FCIC REPORT, supra note 114, at 264–65.
275. Id. at 265.
276. Id.; see also Tim Bowler, The Rise and Fall of Citigroup, BBC (Jan. 16, 2009),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7746077.stm (“If the bank had been allowed to collapse, it
could have caused financial havoc around the globe, seizing up fragile lending markets and
causing untold losses among institutions holding debt and financial products backed by the
company.”).
277. Shannon D. Harrington & Elizabeth Hester, Citigroup Rescues SIVs With $58 Billion
Debt Bailout (Update5), BLOOMBERG.COM (Dec. 14, 2007), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=20601087&refer=home&sid=aS0Dm.iV5BCI.
278. In fact, not even the Chair of the Citigroup Executive Committee comprehended the risks
from these instruments. Loomis, supra note 272, at 69.
279. Evan Thomas & Michael Hirsh, Rubin’s Detail Deficit, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 8, 2008, at 45.
280. Bicksler, supra note 263, at 297.
281. Bowler, supra note 276.
282. Jonathan Stempel, Citigroup stock falls below $1 for first time, REUTERS, Mar. 5, 2009,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/bondsNews/idUSN0532847720090305.

RAMIREZ.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

The Virtues of Private Securities Litigation

4/1/2014 10:47 PM

711

“bonus” of $10.4 million for his last ten months of work which were
marked by staggering losses.283 He exited Citigroup with $40 million
in severance pay.284 Yet, a securities class action based upon a failure
to disclose exposure to subprime mortgages settled for only $590
million.285 The SEC settled a securities fraud claim for $75 million.286
Merrill Lynch CEO Stanley O’Neal garnered $91 million in
compensation for 2006, a year in which Merrill reported record
earnings.287 In October 2007, Merrill recognized $14.1 billion in
subprime losses and O’Neal retired.288 His severance package totaled
$160 million.289 According to the allegations of securities fraud claims
asserted by Merrill’s shareholders, 2006 also marked the beginning of a
multi-year effort by management to mislead investors about the nature
and magnitude of Merrill’s subprime mortgage exposure.290 Merrill
Lynch also worked hard to keep the music playing, and when customers
stopped buying securities based upon subprime mortgages, Merrill
purchased billions of its own products that its customers did not want—
particularly collateralized debt obligation funds (“CDOs”) based upon
subprime mortgages.291 The probable reason: “Merrill became addicted
to the fees that flowed from financing CDOs, which reached $700
million in 2006.”292 Merrill lost $27.61 billion in 2008.293 On January
16, 2009, Merrill Lynch announced it had reached an agreement with

283. Bradley Keoun, Citi Cost-Cutters Skip Offices, Staff for Ex-CEOs Prince, Reed,
BLOOMBERG.COM (Feb. 17, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&refer
=home&sid=a.MJ0tBKx67w.
284. Bicksler, supra note 263, at 297.
285. Nate Raymond and Bernard Vaughan, Judge approves Citigroup $590 million settlement,
REUTERS, Aug. 1, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/01/us-citigroupsettlement-idUSBRE9700T420130801 (“The settlement resolves claims by shareholders who
purchased Citigroup shares from February 2007 to April 2008 that the New York-based bank
misrepresented its exposure to securities known as collateralized debt obligations that were tied to
mortgage investments.”).
286. FCIC REPORT, supra note 114, at 265.
287. Bicksler, supra note 263, at 297.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Merrill Lynch Reveals $475M Deal to Settle Subprime Fraud Suit, SEC. LITIG. & REG.
REP., Jan. 27, 2009 (“The defendants, allegedly motivated by millions of dollars in cash bonuses
and stock award grants tied to the company’s performance, only gradually revealed the true extent
of Merrill’s mortgage-related losses in a series of statements beginning in October 2006.”).
291. See Shawn Tully, Wall Street’s Money Machine Breaks Down, FORTUNE, Nov. 26, 2007,
at 64, 76 (alleging that Merrill was buying nearly all the top-rated debt from dozens of CDOs).
292. Id.
293. Jonathan Stempel, Merrill Q4 loss $15.84 Bln, has material weakness, REUTERS, Feb.
25, 2009, available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/hotStocksNewsUS/idUKTRE51N6YA200902
25.
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the plaintiffs’ counsel to settle such claims for $550 million.294
American International Group, or AIG, once the world’s largest
insurance company, apparently lost more than any other firm.295 On
March 2, 2009, AIG announced the largest quarterly loss in all of
corporate history of $61.7 billion, arising from a type of derivative
termed a credit default swap (“CDS”).296 The CDS business centered in
a subsidiary, AIG Financial Products, which was backed by the full
credit and guarantee of the parent company. 297 The CDS business
essentially guaranteed payment of billions in subprime mortgages. 298
Federal Reserve (“Fed”) Chair Ben Bernanke maintains that AIG
“exploited a huge gap in the regulatory system” and operated as an
unregulated hedge fund that “made huge numbers of irresponsible
bets.”299 Treasury Secretary Geithner concurred, calling AIG a hedge
fund that grew “without any adult supervision.”300 The Treasury
Secretary and the Fed Chair speak with particular authority since they
engineered the bailout of AIG, which left the United States as the owner
of nearly 80% of the firm.301

294. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) 2 (Jan. 16, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/65100/000095012309000815/y74071e8vk.htm.
295. Hugh Son & Margaret Popper, AIG’s CEO Says Insurer Can Still Repay Taxpayers
(Update1), BLOOMBERG.COM (Mar. 2, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=2060
1103&sid=ahykOmEesvWk&refer=us. AIG underwrote $450 billion of credit default swaps that
obligated it to pay on pools of securities in the event that the primary obligees failed to pay. Lilla
Zuill & Kristina Cooke, AIG failure would be disastrous for global markets, REUTERS, Mar. 2,
2009, available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/stocksAndSharesNews/idUKLNE521016200
90302?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0. As of March 2, 2009, the government had
pumped $200 billion into AIG, but it still had $300 billion in credit default swap exposure. Id.
296. See Son & Popper, supra note 295 (requiring a delay to “its plan to sell subsidiaries and
ask for more U.S. help after potential buyers balked because plunging values for financial assets
left some of them short on capital”).
297. Gretchen Morgenson, Behind Insurer’s Crisis, Blind Eye to a Web of Risk, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 27, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/28/business/28melt.html?pagewanted=all.
298. See Michael Lewitt, Wall Street’s Next Big Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2008, at A29
(one money manager defined credit default swaps as a credit insurance contract in which one
party pays another party to protect it from the risk of default on a particular debt instrument: “The
insurer (which could be a bank, an investment bank or a hedge fund) is required to post collateral
to support its payment obligation, but in the insane credit environment that preceded the credit
crisis, this collateral deposit was generally too small”).
299. Economic and Budget Challenges for the Short and Long Term: Hearing Before the S.
Budget Comm., 111th Cong. 3 (2009) (statement of Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
300. President’s Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Overview: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways
& Means, 111th Cong. 3 (2009) (statement of Timothy Geithner, Secretary, U.S. Treasury).
301. Joint Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. & U.S. Dep’t of the
Treasury, U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve Board Announce Participation in AIG Restructuring
Plan (Mar. 2, 2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/200903
02a.htm.
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Essentially, the firm acted as credit insurer; yet, the CDSs were not
insurance and AIG assumed these risks through an unregulated
subsidiary, meaning it did not have to reserve fully against future losses
nor carry any capital to fund potential losses. 302 The fees generated
from the CDSs were consequently free income with little associated
expense.303 AIG literally gambled its viability away in the name of
short term profits.304 When the market for subprime securities crashed,
AIG absorbed huge losses in the form of obligations to subprime
investors.305 The short term profits were used to fund a $600 million
bonus pool for the officers in charge of the unit that underwrote the
CDSs.306 The CEO who managed AIG into this subprime mess was
paid $47 million in severance pay when he was discharged.307 The U.S.
government effectively seized control in late 2008, at a cost of billions
to U.S. taxpayers.308
AIG never disclosed the risks of its CDS business to its shareholders.
Instead, AIG managers told shareholders on a conference call that AIG
was highly unlikely to lose even $1 from the CDS business as late as

302. See id. (noting that AIG and “its regulated and unregulated subsidiaries are subject to
very different resolution frameworks across their broad and diverse operations without an
overarching resolution mechanism”).
303. Stephen Taub, New York: Credit-Default Swaps=Insurance, CFO.COM (Sept. 22, 2008),
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/12285201. Ironically, shortly after AIG’s federal bailout, New
York determined that credit default swaps would be regulated as if they were contracts of
insurance, meaning that firms would have to hold capital reserves to secure the obligations. Id.
304. See Gretchen Morgenson, A.I.G., Where Taxpayers’ Dollars Go to Die, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 8, 2009, at BU1 (stating that AIG obligated itself to assume up to $440 billion in credit
default swaps, which was more than twice its total market value of $200 billion. According to the
article, “[t]hat means the geniuses at A.I.G. who wrote the insurance were willing to bet more
than double their company’s value that defaults would not become problematic. That’s some
throw of the dice. Too bad it came up snake eyes for taxpayers”).
305. By the end of 2007, AIG had lost $61.7 billion due to its subprime related securities.
David Glovin & Joel Rosenblatt, Maurice Greenberg Sues AIG Over ‘Inflated’ Shares (Update1),
BLOOMBERG.COM (Mar. 2, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&
sid=aHDoc7YcjQZI&refer=home.
306. Lilla Zuill, NY AG says targeting exec pay at AIG, elsewhere, REUTERS, OCT. 22, 2008,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSTRE49L6I420081022?pageNumber=
1&virtualBrandChannel=0.
307. Id. It is not clear how much of compensation will ultimately be paid to the AIG
executives because their pay is being challenged by the Attorney General of New York. Id. “‘It
is not just compensation, but incentives—perverse incentives for executives to produce (shortterm) profit rather than long-term growth,’ said Cuomo.” Id. (quoting Andrew Cuomo, New
York Attorney General).
308. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM,
QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 45 (Apr. 24, 2013), available at http://www.sigtarp.
gov/Quarterly%20Reports/April_24_2013_Report_to_Congress.pdf (showing realized losses on
disposition of AIG stock of $13.5 billion).
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August 9, 2007.309 At the time of this statement, Goldman Sachs had
already demanded $1.2 billion in payment to cover AIG’s exposure on
the CDS held just by Goldman.310 The next day AIG actually paid
$450 million to Goldman in response to the Goldman collateral calls. 311
Neither of these facts was disclosed on the conference call.312 Even as
late as December of 2007, AIG told investors that the probability of loss
on the CDS portfolio “is close to zero.”313 At the same time of that
statement AIG was hemorrhaging cash on that very portfolio.314 During
2008, AIG lost $99 billion largely as a result of the CDS portfolio.315
The shares of AIG traded as high as $70 per share in 2007, and as of
March of 2009, the shares traded for $0.42—a loss in value of over
99%.316
Lehman Brothers also appears to have failed in the aftermath of
massive securities fraud.317 The Bankruptcy Trustee for Lehman
appointed former United States Attorney for the Northern District of
Illinois Anton Valukas to investigate possible wrongdoing in connection

309. According to the FCIC:
On August 9, for the first time, AIG executives publicly disclosed the $79 billion in
credit default swaps on the super-senior tranches of CDOs during the company’s
second-quarter earnings call. They acknowledged that the great majority of the
underlying bonds thus insured . . . were backed by subprime mortgages. Of this
amount, $19 billion was written on CDOs predominantly backed by risky BBB-rated
collateral. On the call, Cassano maintained that the exposures were no problem: “It is
hard for us, without being flippant, to even see a scenario within any kind of realm or
reason that would see us losing $1 in any of those transactions.” He concluded: “We
see no issues at all emerging. We see no dollar of loss associated with any of [the
CDO] business. Any reasonable scenario that anyone can draw, and when I say
reasonable, I mean a severe recession scenario that you can draw out for the life of the
securities.”
FCIC REPORT, supra note 114, at 268.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 272.
314. Id.
315. Jonathan Stempel & Lilla Zuill, AIG has $61.7 billion loss, new U.S. aid may not be last,
REUTERS, Mar. 2, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/ousiv/idUSN013445752009
0302.
316. Id.; Matt Krantz, AIG: Removal from the Dow index is the least of your worries, USA
TODAY, Oct. 6, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/columnist/krantz/2008-10-06-aigstock-dow_N.htm.
317. Bloomberg reported in May of 2012 that the SEC would not pursue fraud claims in
connection with the failure of Lehman Brothers based upon a leaked internal memorandum.
Joshua Gallu, SEC Staff Ends Probe of Lehman Without Finding Fraud, BLOOMBERG (May 24,
2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-24/sec-staff-said-to-end-lehman-probe-without
-recommending-action.html.
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with the firm’s collapse on September 15, 2008.318 According to
Valukas: “I found that Lehman’s decision not to disclose to the public a
fair and accurate picture of its financial condition gave rise to colorable
claims against senior officers who oversaw and certified misleading
financial statements.”319 Valukas found that management knowingly
used repurchase agreements with no economic substance to hide the
degree of the firm’s leverage from the investing public.320 In fact, a
whistleblower inside Lehman confirms Valukas’ conclusions regarding
accounting chicanery.321 Lehman’s bankruptcy constituted the initial
shock that triggered the Great Financial Crisis of 2008.322
More recently, even more securities fraud from the subprime debacle
emerged, in connection with the issuance of mortgage-backed securities
by the nation’s most significant banks.323 In November 2013,

318. The Role of the Accounting Profession in Preventing Another Financial Crisis: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., & Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs,
112th Cong. 55 (2011) (statement of Anton R. Valukas, Chairman, Jenner & Block, LLP).
319. Id.
320. Id. at 56. More specifically:
Lehman repeatedly and heavily relied on Repo 105 transactions to temporarily
remove—and I emphasize temporarily—some $50 billion off of Lehman’s balance
sheet right at quarter end. Lehman undertook $38.6 billion, $49.1 billion, and $50.38
billion of Repo 105 transactions at quarter‐end fourth quarter 2007, first quarter 2008,
and second quarter 2008, respectively. Lehman executives described this accounting
device as a “gimmick,” “window dressing,” and a “drug we r on.” Martin Kelly,
Lehman’s former Global Financial Controller, stated unequivocally that there was “no
substance to the transactions.”
Id.
321. Michael Corkery, The Lehman Whistleblower’s Letter, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2010,
http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2010/03/19/breaking-news-here-is-the-letter-at-the-center-of-thelehman-report/.
322. John H. Cochrane & Luigi Zingales, Lehman and the Financial Crisis, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 15, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240529702034401045744031
44004792338.
323. According to the Department of Justice:
The Justice Department, along with federal and state partners, today announced a $13
billion settlement with JPMorgan—the largest settlement with a single entity in
American history—to resolve federal and state civil claims arising out of the
packaging, marketing, sale and issuance of residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) by JPMorgan, Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual prior to Jan. 1, 2009. As
part of the settlement, JPMorgan acknowledged it made serious misrepresentations to
the public—including the investing public—about numerous RMBS transactions.
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department, Federal and State Partners Secure Record
$13 Billion Global Settlement with JPMorgan for Misleading Investors About Securities
Containing Toxic Mortgages (Nov. 19, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013
/November/13-ag-1237.html. The Department seems poised to pursue more such blockbuster
recoveries related to fraud in connection with the purchase and sale of mortgage-backed
securities:
The settlement includes a statement of facts, in which JPMorgan acknowledges that it

RAMIREZ.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

716

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

4/1/2014 10:47 PM

[Vol. 45

JPMorgan Chase (the nation’s largest bank) settled claims of fraud
brought by government-affiliated investors to the tune of $13 billion—
the largest settlement in history. 324 Shortly before this massive
settlement, JPMorgan Chase settled similar claims brought by private
investors for $4.3 billion.325 JPMorgan Chase projects total exposure
from its mortgage-backed securities misrepresentations to total $23
billion.326 In 2011, Bank of America agreed to pay $11 billion to
Fannie Mae.327 In all, the megabanks have paid $66 billion to investors
in toxic mortgages and experts project $100 billion in total payments
regularly represented to RMBS investors that the mortgage loans in various securities
complied with underwriting guidelines. Contrary to those representations, as the
statement of facts explains, on a number of different occasions, JPMorgan employees
knew that the loans in question did not comply with those guidelines and were not
otherwise appropriate for securitization, but they allowed the loans to be securitized—
and those securities to be sold—without disclosing this information to investors. This
conduct, along with similar conduct by other banks that bundled toxic loans into
securities and misled investors who purchased those securities, contributed to the
financial crisis.
Id. In one sample, 27% of the loans in a pool did not meet underwriting representations. More
specifically: “According to a [report] prepared . . . by one . . . due diligence vendor . . . of the
23,668 loans the vendor reviewed for JPMorgan, 6,238 of them, or 27 percent, were initially
graded Event 3 loans.” DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATEMENT OF FACTS 5 (2013), available at
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/94320131119151031990622.pdf. An Event 3 loan is a
loan that does meet underwriting standards, has no compensating factors for any deficiencies or is
missing critical documentation. Id. at 3. JPMorgan still included more than half the loans in
mortgage backed securities pools. Id. at 4–5.
324. Michael Hiltzik, How JPMorgan (sort of) copped to mortgage fraud—and won, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 19, 2013, http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-mh-jpmorgan-fraud-2013
1120,0,4332353.story#axzz2lDksX6I7. JP Morgan did not admit to any violation of law,
including fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of mortgage-backed securities. Instead, in
the statement of facts accompanying the settlement:
The statement’s main theme concerns JPMorgan’s sale of mortgage-backed securities
to investors, including pension funds acting on behalf of their working-class members.
The securities comprised pooled mortgages, and their values were based on the quality
of those loans. The factors included the accuracy of the property appraisals, the
borrowers’ income statements and the level of documentation thereof. What the
statement makes plain is that JPMorgan systematically lied about those factors, that its
own staff knew about the misrepresentations and brought them to the attention of
executives, and the bank sold the securities to unsuspecting buyers anyway.
Id. This means that private investors in the very mortgage-backed securities will still need to
prove all elements of a Rule 10b-5 action. See id. (JPMorgan’s chairman and chief executive
stated, “[w]e did not admit to a violation of the law”).
325. Karen Freifeld, JPMorgan Chase to pay $4.5 Billion in mortgage security deal,
REUTERS, Nov. 15, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/16/us-jpmmortgage-deal-idUSBRE9AE15T20131116.
326. Stephen Gandel, JPMorgan: We’re prepared for $23 Billion in legal bills, CNNMONEY
(Oct. 13, 2013), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2013/10/11/jpmorgan-23-billion-legal-fees/.
327. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Peter Eavis, In Deal, Bank of America Extends Retreat From
Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2013, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/01/07/bank-of-americaextends-retreat-from-mortgages/?_r=0.
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from their issuance of mortgage-backed securities.328 This is all
consistent with the findings of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
(“FCIC”) that the mortgage market in the U.S. was pervaded by fraud in
connection with the purchase and sale of mortgage-backed securities
immediately prior to the meltdown of 2008.329 Indeed, the FCIC
reported that up to $1 trillion of mortgage loans were tainted by fraud
leading to losses of $112 billion.330 By any measure, the Great
Financial Crisis of 2008 originated in a massive securities fraud
involving mortgage-backed securities.331
The FCIC also found one particularly pernicious form of securities
fraud that emerged in connection with mortgage-backed securities.332
Specifically, the so-called Magnetar Trade involved a sponsor of a
collateralized debt obligation fund holding the riskiest equity tranche of
the investment while simultaneously shorting the more senior
tranches—unbeknownst to investors in the senior tranches.333 The
328. Saabira Chaudhuri, U.S. Banks’ Legal Tab Is Poised to Rise, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2013,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304470504579163810113326856.
329. FCIC REPORT, supra note 114, at 160 (reporting that one analysis found that 13% of
loans generated from 2005–2007 contained sufficient misrepresentations for compensation if
securitized).
330. Id.
331. The SEC also sued mortgage securitizers for fraud in connection with the sale of
mortgage-backed securities, and collected very large fines even if not as large as the settlements
discussed above. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Bank of
America With Fraud in RMBS Offering (Aug. 6, 2013), available at
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370539751924#.UpzkLeL1OAo
(SEC alleges that Bank of America failed to disclose to mortgage-backed securities investors that
more than 70% “of the mortgages [were] originated through the bank’s ‘wholesale’ channel of
mortgage brokers unaffiliated with Bank of America entities. Bank of America knew that such
wholesale channel loans—described by Bank of America’s then-CEO as “toxic waste”—
presented vastly greater risks of severe delinquencies ”); Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, SEC Charges J.P. Morgan and Credit Suisse With Misleading Investors in RMBS
Offerings (Nov. 16, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/Press
Release/1365171486012#.UpzchuL1OAo (J.P. Morgan fine of $296.9 million and Credit Suisse
fine of $120 million); Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Royal Bank of
Scotland Subsidiary with Misleading Investors in Subprime RMBS Offering (Nov. 7, 2013),
available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370540300002#.UpzZ
2uL1OAo ($150 million fine paid).
332. FCIC REPORT, supra note 114, at 191–93. See generally Jesse Eisinger & Jake
Bernstein, The Magnetar Trade: How One Hedge Fund Helped Keep the Bubble Going,
PROPUBLICA (Apr. 9, 2010, 12:00 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/the-magnetar-tradehow-one-hedge-fund-helped-keep-the-housing-bubble-going (discussing how the “Magnetar”
hedge fund sponsored a complex securities deal misleading investors and earning “outsized
returns” during the year the financial crisis began).
333. As Eisinger & Bernstein explain:
According to bankers and others involved, the Magnetar Trade worked this way: The
hedge fund bought the riskiest portion of a kind of securities known as collateralized
debt obligations—CDOs. If housing prices kept rising, this would provide a solid
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sponsor would then influence the selection of the collateral underlying
the CDO to assure the rapid default of the senior tranches.334 The
sponsor would thereby profit from its short positions in the senior
tranche well beyond the losses from holding the riskiest tranche.335 The
victims of this fraud included both the investors in the senior tranches as
well as the mortgage borrowers entering into loan arrangements that
were specifically designed for rapid default.336 The FCIC found that by
2006 the Magnetar Trade infected much of the mortgage market.337
Ultimately the SEC settled massive securities fraud claims against
Goldman Sachs, Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase in connection with this
scam.338 At the time, the Goldman settlement was the largest SEC fine
in history.339
The total cost of the Great Financial Crisis of 2008 cannot yet be

return for many years. But that’s not what hedge funds are after. They want outsized
gains, the sooner the better, and Magnetar set itself up for a huge win: It placed bets
that portions of its own deals would fail.
Id.
334. Eisinger & Bernstein state:
Along the way, it did something to enhance the chances of that happening, according to
several people with direct knowledge of the deals. They say Magnetar pressed to
include riskier assets in their CDOs that would make the investments more vulnerable
to failure. The hedge fund acknowledges it bet against its own deals but says the
majority of its short positions, as they are known on Wall Street, involved similar
CDOs that it did not own.
Id.
335. The FCIC found that in Merrill Lynch’s $1.5 billion Norma CDO, issued in 2007
Magnetar Capital, bought the riskiest equity tranche while shorting other tranches in Norma while
involved in the selection of the assets for the CDO. FCIC REPORT, supra note 114, at 192. The
SEC brought its first enforcement action for securities fraud against a CDO manager involving
Magnetar Capital on October 18, 2013. See generally Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
SEC Announces Fraud Charges Against Collateral Manager Of CDO (Oct. 18, 2013), available
at http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370539908794#.UoiFnuL3Nbx
(discussing the charges brought by the SEC against Harding Advisory LLC and Wing F. Chau for
misleading investors in a collateralized debt obligation and breaching fiduciary duties).
336. Id. (explaining how Magnetar loans were set up to intentionally default, making clear the
intent of Chau and Harding to place failing bets on its own deals).
337. FCIC REPORT, supra note 114, at 192 (“An FCIC survey of more than 170 hedge funds
encompassing over $1.1 trillion in assets as of early 2010 found this to be a common strategy
among medium-size hedge funds: of all the CDOs issued in the second half of 2006, more than
half of the equity tranches were purchased by hedge funds that also shorted other tranches.”).
338. Steven A. Ramirez, The Real Subprime and Predatory Fraud (Fannie and Freddie
Acquitted Again and Again II), CORP. JUST. BLOG (Nov. 6, 2011, 6:41 PM),
http://corporatejusticeblog.blogspot.com/2011/11/real-subprime-and-predatory-fraud.html.
Citigroup and JP Morgan Chase settled charges for $285 million and $153.6 million, respectively.
Id.
339. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Goldman Sachs to Pay Record $550 Million
to Settle SEC Charges Related to Subprime Mortgage CDO (July 15, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-123.htm.
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calculated. Nevertheless, the cost of the crisis to the U.S. economy
easily exceeds $15 trillion. Foregone GDP alone amounts to between
$6 and $14 trillion.340 This number doubles once losses in total wealth
(including losses in human capital) are tallied in terms of permanent
losses to future output.341 The unprecedented efforts of the U.S.
government to rescue the economy also must be added to the total cost
of the crisis.342
“An estimated $12.6 trillion in extraordinary
government assistance was allocated to struggling businesses and
households.”343 Much of this support meant increased spending and the
lost revenue from the recession added $8 trillion in excess public debt
through November of 2013.344 In the future, both the Federal Reserve
and the federal government will face constraints as a result of these
extraordinary efforts.345 Today, employment and wages remain
stagnant.346 Thus, a full reckoning remains years down the road.
In sum, the subprime debacle spared few from the ravages of
securities fraud because it led to the Great Financial Crisis of 2008.347
340. TYLER ATKINSON ET AL., HOW BAD WAS IT? THE COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE
2007–09 FINANCIAL CRISIS 6 (July 2013), available at http://dallasfed.org/assets/documents
/research/staff/staff1301.pdf.
341. Id. at 2 (“The path of consumption since 2007 suggests household expectations of total
wealth have been revised down significantly. It implies that the cost of the crisis would be more
than double the 40 to 90 percent estimate based on output loss alone.”).
342. Atkinson et al., state:
Unprecedented fiscal and monetary action may have prevented a full-blown
depression, but such intervention was not without significant costs. Society must deal
with the consequences of a swollen federal debt, an expanded Federal Reserve balance
sheet, and increased regulations and government intervention for years to come.
Although we take a more comprehensive approach to extraordinary government
spending as a “cost” of the crisis, this consideration of the broader impact of such
public sector capital allocation is not directly comparable with our other cost
calculations.
Id. at 2–3.
343. Id. at 15.
344. Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Federal Debt: Total Public Debt (GFDEBTN), ECON.
RES., http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GFDEBTN/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2014).
345. ATKINSON ET AL., supra note 340, at 17 (“The fact that the nation is vulnerable to this
reduced ability to respond to future downturns is an implicit, but significant, cost of the financial
crisis.”).
346. The civilian employment ratio, perhaps the broadest measure of employment remains
stuck at 58.3%, barely above the lows in employment seen at the depths of the crisis. Fed.
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Economic Research, Civilian Employment to Population Ratio
(EMRATIO), ECON. RES., http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/EMRATIO (last visited Mar.
10, 2014).
347. As of this writing, another massive securities fraud has emerged. Specifically, due to a
number of guilty pleas and payment of massive fines, there is no doubt that securities fraud
occurred in connection with a massive scheme to manipulate a key benchmark interest rate
known as LIBOR. See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, UBS Securities Japan Co. Ltd
Sentenced for Long-running Manipulation of Libor (Sept. 18, 2013), available at
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Shareholders of public firms certainly suffered massive losses as a
result of material misrepresentations like those that senior officers at
AIG peddled to its shareholders. Other shareholders purchased shares
from insiders like Angelo Mozilo without the benefit of the inside facts
that their sellers possessed. Investors in mortgage backed securities had
no clue about the nefarious schemes that the sellers and sponsors of
such securities had executed. As shocking as the Enron series of
securities frauds, those frauds pale in comparison to the frauds
perpetrated in connection with securities as part of the Great Financial
Crisis of 2008. Indeed, at bottom, massive securities fraud defines the
Great Financial Crisis of 2008 and led to an historic financial collapse.
III. THE VIRTUES OF PRIVATE LITIGATION
The last part of this Article shows that the transformation of private
securities litigation away from its historical moorings is a dismal failure.
The very concept of vexatious litigation against the most powerful and
well-heeled firms and executives, with clear ability to hire the most
skilled, experienced and well-connected law firms, today seems
improbable at best.348 Large firms always have more resources, and
always can bear the massive cost for real discovery better than
plaintiffs’ firms.349 Federal judges typically hail from larger law firms
that represent the largest corporations and the wealthiest executives and
seem far more focused on the interests of big business than protecting

http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/September/13-crm-1039.html. I do not include an extended
discussion of the LIBOR scandal in this Article because as of publication it did not lead to, arise
from, or foreshadow, a macroeconomically significant financial crisis. Moreover, while the
LIBOR scandal qualifies as massive securities fraud, claims and enforcement actions appear to be
in their infancy and therefore, facts and judicial rulings regarding the precise contours of what
occurred, who was responsible and what damages were sustained, are not in the same state of
maturity as the massive securities fraud underlying the Great Financial Crisis of 2008. See Karen
Gullo, Schwab Sues BofA and Other Banks Over Libor Manipulation, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 30,
2013, 11:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-01/schwab-sues-bofa-and-otherbanks-over-libor-manipulation.html. Nevertheless, it surely exemplifies the inadequacy of
current legal and regulatory frameworks in deterring securities fraud. Even at this early stage,
however, it is perhaps the greatest securities fraud in history because of the sheer quantity of
securities tied to LIBOR. See 15 U.S.C. § 8302 (2012) (defining securities-based swaps to be
securities).
348. Indeed, even after the PSLRA imposed more scrutiny upon securities litigation only four
cases of frivolous class action filings emerged in the ten years following the PSLRA. Choi &
Thompson, supra note 28, at 1502.
349. Amazingly, during the debates surrounding the PSLRA, Senator Orrin Hatch stated:
“These lawyers are filing these lawsuits so that they can terrorize American companies into
paying exorbitant settlements because they know these companies cannot afford the high legal
fees that would be required to defend themselves even against meritless lawsuits.” 141 CONG.
REC. S19053–54 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
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plaintiffs.350 Longstanding court observers wonder aloud about judicial
bias.351 Finally, no lawyer has either ethical or monetary incentive to
settle for too much too soon before they know sufficient facts to form a
sound professional opinion.352 There was no litigation explosion353 and
the threat of frivolous litigation was always grossly overstated.354
Therefore, the entire war on private securities litigation rests on a weak
foundation—as has been established repeatedly elsewhere.355
The virtues of private litigation, on the other hand, seem worthy of
review given the huge costs spawned by the war on private securities
350. See generally Sheldon Goldman & Elliot E. Slotnick, Clinton’s Second Term Judiciary:
Picking Judges Under Fire, in JUDICIAL POLITICS 68, 74–79 (E. Slotnick ed., 1999) (showing
that federal judicial appointments from larger firms far outpace appointments from smaller firms);
Miller, supra note 16, at 364 (“The Supreme Court’s opinions in Twombly, Iqbal, Wal-Mart, and
Concepcion, the plurality opinion in McIntyre, and other judicial pronouncements reveal that a
number of federal judges (and Justices) seem singularly concerned about the litigation burdens on
corporations and government officials.”). Professor Murdock argues that the judiciary is
“complicit” in the massive securities frauds of recent vintage. Murdock, supra note 155, at 209
(“The theme of this article is that courts and legislatures, particularly Congress and the federal
courts, led by the Supreme Court, have been complicit by creating an environment in which
management is not called to account.”).
351. Miller states:
People frequently ask me: “Is this a business-oriented Supreme Court?” Or
occasionally, someone will assert, with a certain bite in his or her voice: “The Chamber
of Commerce seems to have a seat on the Supreme Court; any truth to that?” I don’t
believe that, but others have voiced sentiments in that general vein. Despite that
expression of faith, I think it is fair to say that a number of the Justices (as well as other
federal judges) have a predilection (perhaps subliminal) that favors business and
governmental interests.
Miller, supra note 16, at 366. Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How
Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431, 1471 (2013) (empirical study
finding that the Roberts Court is “friendlier” to business than either the Rehnquist Court or
Burger Court).
352. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1, 1.3 (1983) (defining “competence” and
“diligence”).
353. As Professor Miller recounts:
Americans have been defamed as fortune hunters trying to win the litigation lottery.
Bogus caseload statistics are propagated, while empirical data is ignored, and fears are
spread by claims that there is a litigation explosion in this country and that Americans
are paying a litigation tax that renders our businesses uncompetitive. Political
candidates and office holders score cheap points with attacks on our justice system,
cloaking themselves in the deceptive mantle of “tort reform.” Finally, urban legends
about certain cases—and sometimes even imagined cases—abound, typically in highly
distorted form. The so-called McDonald’s coffee cup case, for example, has been
grotesquely misdescribed and, with the aid of simplistic media accounts, has become a
cosmic anecdote recounted countless times in the most disparaging terms.
Miller, supra note 16, at 302–03.
354. Even beyond class actions (the clear concern of the PSLRA) only eleven securities cases
resulted in sanctions in the ten years following the PSLRA. Choi & Thompson, supra note 28, at
1502.
355. See supra notes 10, 155, 161, 166, 169, 170, 172, 180, 184, 185, 186.
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litigation and the massive securities frauds that followed in its wake.356
Private securities litigation offers institutional advantages not available
from public enforcement, such as criminal proceedings brought by the
United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) or civil enforcement
proceedings brought by the SEC. The debate regarding private
securities litigation too often overlooks these attributes.
First, private enforcement operates in a depoliticized context.357
Senators and even presidents have no ability to influence private
securities litigation through appropriations, informal influence over
government agents, or promises of career advancement.358 A typical
plaintiffs’ attorney (as well as her clients) acts to maximize payoffs and
would suffer a competitive disadvantage if influenced in a partisan
manner.359 Indeed, despite numerous attacks on the plaintiffs’ bar
during the congressional debates surrounding the PSLRA, no criticism
ever accused a plaintiffs’ attorney of allowing politics to influence the
management of any private securities action.360 On the other hand,

356. Ramirez, supra note 241, at 360.
357. See Issacharoff, supra note 25, at 379 (statement of SEC Commissioner Harvey
Goldschmid) (“Private enforcement is . . . a safety valve against the potential capture of the
agency by industry.”). Enzo Incandela makes the same point but appropriately cast in terms of
the rule of law:
In today’s market environment, protecting a broad application of the private right of
action against securities fraud is imperative. The SEC has faced funding restrictions,
and the reduction in available resources has limited its oversight capabilities. Also,
anti-regulatory headwinds in the political arena create obstacles for the SEC to carry
out its objectives. For regulators and investors alike, the apolitical private right of
action under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 serves as an essential supplement to the ongoing
focus of maintaining an orderly financial marketplace governed by the rule of law.
Incandela, supra note 30, at 938–39 (internal citations omitted). Those holding the power to bend
the law irrationally for profit cannot meaningfully be said to be subject to the law. RAMIREZ,
supra note 7, at 184–216.
358. According to former SEC Chair Schapiro:
The amount of resources available to the SEC has not kept pace with the rapid
expansion in the securities market over the past few years . . . either in terms of the
number of firms or the explosion in the types of new and increasingly complex
products . . . some of which were expressly designed to avoid SEC regulation and
oversight.
Zachary A. Goldfarb, SEC Officials Say the Agency Lacks Cash for Full Oversight, WASH. POST,
Jan. 28, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/27/AR20090
12703395.html.
359. See Burch, supra note 23, at 72 (“Private investors suffering the financial consequences
of fraud often have superior knowledge about the injury, and their profit-seeking motive makes
them more efficient than their bureaucratic counterpart.”).
360. For example, former Senator Alfonse D’Amato of New York, stated that plaintiffs’
securities lawyers were “sharks, sharks for hire” and “bandits.” 141 CONG. REC. S17935–36
(daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. D’Amato). This demonization demonstrates that the
PSLRA was founded on less than a rational basis.

RAMIREZ.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

The Virtues of Private Securities Litigation

4/1/2014 10:47 PM

723

recently both the SEC361 and DOJ appear to act pursuant to powerful
political considerations.362 Indeed, criminal prosecutions for securities
fraud plunged in the years prior to the crisis and still have not returned
to their 2002 high.363 Thus, robust private actions operate as a check
361. See Edward Wyatt, Responding to Critics, S.E.C. Defends ‘No Wrongdoing’ Settlements,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2012, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/22/s-e-c-chairwoman-defendssettlement-practices/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 (reporting on a New York Times study
finding that the SEC allows “nearly all of the biggest Wall Street firms [to settle] fraud cases by
promising never to violate a law that they had already promised not to break, usually multiple
times” and that the SEC “repeatedly granted exemptions to the biggest Wall Street firms from
punishments intended by Congress and regulators to act as a deterrent to multiple fraud
violations”); see also Walt Bogdanich & Gretchen Morgenson, S.E.C. Is Reported to Be
Examining a Big Hedge Fund, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2006, at A1 (reporting that SEC investigator,
Gary J. Aguirre, claimed he was terminated due to the political power of the hedge fund he
investigated); Gretchen Morgenson, S.E.C. Settles With a Former Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES, June 29,
2010, at B3 (reporting that the SEC settled a wrongful termination suit with Aguirre for
$755,000).
362. Criminal prosecutions against Wall Street executives have been non-existent. In early
2013, Frontline investigated “why Wall Street’s leaders have escaped prosecution for any fraud
related to the sale of bad mortgages.” Frontline: The Untouchables (PBS television broadcast
Jan. 22, 2013), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/untouchables/. Among its
findings was an apparent lack of criminal Grand Jury investigations involving Wall Street
executives. Id. The Inspector General of the Department of Justice also found that the
Department mislead the public with regard to its prosecutorial efforts against financial and
mortgage fraud. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AUDIT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S EFFORTS TO
ADDRESS MORTGAGE FRAUD, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL AUDIT DIVISION, AUDIT
REPORT 14-12, at 29 (Mar. 2014), available at http://justice. gov/oig/reports/2014/a1412.pdf.
Thus, the criminal response to the frauds underlying the Great Financial Crisis of 2008–2009 has
been weaker than reported. It was not always so. As stated in United States v. Mulheren, 938
F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1991):
In the late 1980’s a wide prosecutorial net was cast upon Wall Street. Along with the
usual flotsam and jetsam, the government’s catch included some of Wall Street’s
biggest, brightest, and now infamous—Ivan Boesky, Dennis Levine, Michael Milken,
Robert Freeman, Martin Siegel, Boyd L. Jeffries, and Paul A. Bilzerian—each of
whom either pleaded guilty to or was convicted of crimes involving illicit trading
scandals.
Id. at 365; see also JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES 16 (1991) (noting that Dennis Levine
confessed to $12.6 million in insider-trading profits, Ivan Boesky agreed to pay $100 million in
sanctions and Michael Milken agreed to pay $600 million); Dennis B. Levine, The Inside Story of
An Inside Trader, FORTUNE, May 21, 1990, at 1, 80 (admitting that Dennis Levine “built $39,750
into $11.5 million” through seven weeks of insider trading); The Insider-Trading Case’s Cast of
Characters, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 1988, at E4 (detailing law enforcement activity against the web
of insider trading). Today not a single major figure from the fraud-ridden subprime debacle has
faced criminal enforcement. Joe Nocera, Biggest Fish Face Little Risk of Being Caught, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 25, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/26/business/economy/26nocera.html?p
agewanted=all&_r=0 (“Most of the . . . Wall Street bigwigs whose firms took unconscionable
risks—risks that nearly brought the global financial system to its knees—aren’t even on Justice’s
radar screen. Nor has there been a single indictment against any top executive at a subprime
lender.”).
363. Michael Smallberg, TRACking the Decline in Criminal Prosecutions for Financial
Fraud, TRAC (Nov. 30, 2011), http://trac.syr.edu/tracatwork/detail/A575.html.
Fraud
prosecutions involving financial institutions also plunged in the years before the crisis and
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upon the dangers of agency capture.
Second, private claims of securities fraud require no government
bureaucracy or other government funding support, other than the routine
operation of a court system. This greatly expands enforcement
resources with no substantial taxpayer expenditure.364 Further, as in
other areas, the private sector delivers services more efficiently than
public agencies.365 These private attorneys general will face market
incentives to build networks of potential informants, tipsters and
whistleblowers and these activities continue regardless of government
resources or budget cuts.366 Consequently, important law enforcement
objectives can be achieved through private litigation at zero or very low
cost to the government.367 Simply stated: private securities litigation is
a “most effective weapon in the enforcement” of the federal securities
laws and “a necessary supplement to Commission action.”368 This
means a diminished need for bureaucratic regulation.
Third, only private litigation both strips the fraudfeasor of the
benefits of their wrongdoing and compensates the victim.369 This in

continued downward even after the catastrophe. Criminal Prosecutions for Financial Institution
Fraud Continue to Fall, TRACREPORTS (Nov. 15, 2011), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim
/267/.
364. Issacharoff, supra note 25, at 381. The former SEC chief of enforcement has stated:
“Given the continued growth in the size and complexity of our securities markets, and the
absolute certainty that persons seeking to perpetrate financial fraud will always be among us,
private actions will continue to be essential to the maintenance of investor protection.” Private
Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the S.
Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 113 (1993) (statement of William R.
McLucas, Director, Division of Enforcement, SEC) [hereinafter Private Litigation Hearings].
365. Burch, supra note 23, at 73; see also William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private
Attorney General” Is—and Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2149–50 (2004) (“Private
attorneys may be better at [enforcement] for a variety of reasons—because public attorneys may
be fewer in number, underfunded, less skilled, or prone to political pressures.”).
366. Burch, supra note 23, at 75 (“Private aggregation combined with contingency fees
deputizes plaintiffs’ attorneys to initiate cases that the SEC and exchanges either overlook or lack
the budget to bring.”).
367. Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the 22d Annual Securities
Regulation Institute: Between Caveat Emptor and Caveat Venditor: The Middle Ground of
Litigation Reform (Jan. 25, 1995), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive
/1995/spch023.txt (“[T]he longtime SEC belief [is] that private rights of action are not only
fundamental to the success of our securities markets, they are an essential complement to the
SEC’s own enforcement program.”).
368. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
369. Indeed, a representative of the North American Securities Administrators Association,
representing all fifty state securities regulators, stated: “[P]rivate actions . . . are essential to deter
prospective criminals, compensate the victims of fraud, and maintain public confidence in the
marketplace.” The Market Reform Act of 1989: Joint Hearings before the Subcomm. on Sec. of
the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 101st Cong. 124 (1989) (statement of Mark
J. Griffin, Director, Division of Securities, Utah Department of Commerce).
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turn creates more incentives for enforcement and more disincentives for
securities fraud.370
The focus of the SEC does not include
compensation for victims.371
While the SEC frequently seeks
disgorgement, too often the SEC settles too low in order to move on to
other cases and score more enforcement “hits.”372 The DOJ does not
typically focus on compensating victims.373 Broadening the private
enforcement of the securities laws therefore directly influences the
risk/reward relationship that motivates many criminals. Compensation
of victims enhances investor confidence.374 That reduces the political
demand for more heavy-handed regulation.
Fourth, private remedies allow a reduced reliance upon ex ante
government regulation. Such regulation typically results in high entry
barriers for insurgent business and higher transaction costs for those
businesses that refrain from fraudulent misconduct.375 Government
regulation also operates in a pro-cyclical way: during boom times
regulators become complacent and face pressure not to impede
prosperity but in times of difficulty regulators awaken and crack down
on deleterious practices in a way that can stifle non-fraudulent
business.376 Private attorneys naturally focus first on the most wrongful
actors, escape open political pressure for permissiveness and are not
likely to refrain from the pursuit of viable claims based upon passing
economic conditions.
370. For example, the two most remarkable frauds of the Enron crisis generated $13 billion in
settlement payments. See, e.g., In re Enron Corp. Sec. Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., No. MDL1446, 2008 WL 4178151 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 8, 2008) (approving $7 billion settlement); In re
WorldCom Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 3288, 2005 WL 2319118 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2005)
(approving $6 billion settlement).
371. “[T]he Commission in no sense is to be considered a collection agency. . . . [T]he
responsibility for examining the information and determining the investment merit of securities
and the risks involved in their purchase rests with the investor.” RICHARD W. JENNINGS &
HAROLD MARSH, JR., SECURITIES REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 31–32 (5th ed. 1982).
372. See Bob Van Voris, Citigroup May Need to Pay More to Keep SEC Accord, Attorneys
Say, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 23, 2011, 11:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-1123/citigroup-may-need-to-pay-more-to-keep-sec-deal-lawyers-say.html.
373. In fact, between 2000 and 2002, private securities litigation returned twice as much to
victims of securities fraud than public enforcement actions. Issacharoff, supra note 25, at 380–
81.
374. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 37 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 715 (statement of
Sens. Sarbanes, Bryan, and Boxer) (stating that investor “confidence is maintained because
investors know they have effective remedies against persons who defraud them”).
375. Issacharoff, supra note 25, at 382 (“Even at the purely descriptive level, private
enforcement is so central to our system of ex post accountability that the idea that a sufficient
level of state or federal regulation could effectively displace private litigation is almost
inconceivable.”).
376. Anton R. Valukus, White Collar Crime and Economic Recession, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
1, 2.

RAMIREZ.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

726

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

4/1/2014 10:47 PM

[Vol. 45

Fifth, the broad definition of a security for purposes of the federal
securities laws assures that virtually all financial transactions with the
ability to disturb financial stability and macroeconomic conditions fall
within the scope of the private remedy under Rule 10b-5.377 At its
broadest, a security is defined as an investment of money, in a common
enterprise, with the expectation of profit, primarily from the efforts of
others.378 This definition is the essence of passive investment.379 As
such, no broader mechanism exists for securing honest markets in the
world of finance and investment than private securities litigation. Rule
10b-5 thereby acts as the broadest protector of financial stability.
In essence, private litigation is a market-based mechanism for
securing information disclosure in a very broad range of financial
transactions in accordance with fundamental norms of capitalism and
market ideology. Plaintiffs’ counsel would be foolish to take a weak
case against the most well-represented defendants in our society today,
if not ever.380 Frivolous claims will result in sanctions which will
provide a further disincentive for pursuing weak claims.381 Plaintiffs’
counsel will also investigate based upon the perceived net present value
of a potential claim which must be discounted for uncertainty. 382 To the
377. The definition of a security includes over twenty instruments—such as bonds or stock—
as well as a catch-all for “any instrument commonly known as a security.” See 15 U.S.C. §§
77b(a)(1), 78c(a)(10) (2012). One such instrument is an “investment contract.” Id.; see also SEC
v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946).
378. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. at 299.
Subsequent decisions have modified the third prong of Howey from “solely” to
“substantially.” For an investment to be deemed a security, Howey requires that the
expectation of profits from the investment come “solely” from the efforts of others;
courts have interpreted “solely” to mean “predominantly,” recognizing that if “solely”
were construed literally, the slightest effort on the part of the investor would frustrate
the remedial purposes of the federal securities laws.
Lydie Nadia Cabrera Pierre-Louis, Controlling a Financial Jurassic Park, 8 U.C. DAVIS BUS.
L.J. 35, 63 (2007).
379. “Congress therefore did not attempt precisely to cabin the scope of the Securities Acts.
Rather, it enacted a definition of ‘security’ sufficiently broad to encompass virtually any
instrument that might be sold as an investment.” Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61
(1990); see also SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 393 (2004).
380. The most logical explanation for the conduct of plaintiffs’ counsel is that they respond to
probability, transactions costs, recoverable damages and an insurmountable degree of uncertainty.
See Robert J. Rhee, A Price Theory of Legal Bargaining: An Inquiry into the Selection of
Settlement and Litigation Under Uncertainty, 56 EMORY L.J. 619, 691 (2006) (stating that
litigation decisions are the result of efforts to price an “ambiguous legal claim. By focusing on
probability and transaction cost, the standard economic model fails to incorporate all risks into its
valuation model, and thus the true economic cost of resolution is not reflected in the valuation. It
overstates the measurability of probability”).
381. See supra notes 161–66 and accompanying text.
382. See generally Choi, supra note 17 (empirically studying the impact of the PSLRA,
including how plaintiffs’ attorneys manage securities class actions).
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extent that plaintiffs’ counsel seeks recovery for other than the strongest
claims or expends resources to investigate the weakest claims they
would soon meet the most high-priced lawyers in a court of law and be
subject to a dispositive motion.383 It defies logic to assume that the
wealthiest in America today would succumb to litigation threats based
upon weak claims.384 In fact, if the wealthy consistently paid out the
cost of defense each time they were sued, the plaintiffs’ attorneys would
get very wealthy simply by suing the richest again and again.385 In
sum, market pressures here actually do currently provide sufficient
383.
[C]lass action defendants can and routinely do use dispositive motions to quickly
dispose of frivolous claims. Researchers at the Federal Judicial Center conducting an
empirical study of class actions in four federal district courts found that, for at least
one-third of the 407 class actions they surveyed, “judicial rulings on motions
terminated the litigation without a settlement, coerced or otherwise.” In sum,
dispositive motions provide a significant legal safeguard against frivolous class
actions.
Allan Kanner & Tibor Nagy, Exploding the Blackmail Myth: A New Perspective on Class Action
Settlements, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 681, 695 (2005) (citing THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL.,
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO
THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 42 (1996)).
384. As Professor Coffee states:
The true “strike suit” nuisance action, filed only because it was too expensive to
defend, is, in this author’s judgment, a beast like the unicorn, more discussed than
directly observed. Although small settlements may have been impelled in part by the
high cost of defense, the corresponding observation is that the small damages in these
cases also did not justify much effort on the plaintiff’s side. Neither side wanted to
invest much effort in them—but this does not make them inherently frivolous.
Coffee, supra note 185, at 1536 n.5. Professor Miller states that “extortionate settlements may be
but another urban legend.” Miller, supra note 185, at 103.
385. “If the defendant[s] . . . in a derivative suit or securities class action view themselves as
‘repeat players,’ they may believe that yielding to extortion in this fashion will only expose them
to future litigation. Hence, they may behave strategically and insist on going to trial.” John C.
Coffee Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for
Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 702
(1986). Professor Silver proposes that:
By describing class actions as legalized blackmail, judges have used inflammatory
rhetoric that impugns the character of plaintiffs and trial lawyers who bring class
actions, and of trial judges who certify them. They have done this needlessly and, I
believe, wrongly. The problem in class actions is not blackmail and does not resemble
blackmail in any interesting respect. The problem, assuming it exists, is excessive
pressure resulting in decisions to settle made under duress.When one describes the
problem dispassionately, one can see its factual and normative components clearly.
One can also see that the argument supporting the claim of duress has not been made
persuasively. Some versions of the argument conflict with others. Some versions rest
on factual claims that are wrong, doubtful, unproven, or outdated . . . . Judges
should . . . leave the task of demonizing plaintiffs, trial lawyers, and trial judges to
others.
Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1357, 1429–30 (2003).
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incentives for plaintiffs’ counsel to pursue only meritorious claims.
Of course, these virtues of private securities litigation remain
unattainable so long as the substantive law underlying securities fraud
defies the original conception of the federal securities laws.386 In
particular, for securities litigation to achieve its deterrent and
compensatory purposes, aiding and abetting must be restored, pleading
standards must revert to their historic norm, and individuals must face
the prospect of liability for damages payments.387 Remedies under the
Securities Act must be restored.388
Congress must repeal the
SLUSA.389 The judicial war on private securities litigation must end,
and judicial innovations and legislation should expansively restore
securities litigation to where it stood in the 1980s so that private
securities litigation can operate to maintain investor confidence and by
extension financial stability.390
The goal should be to fundamentally change the risk/reward
relationship facing corporate and financial elites. While one may argue
that the approach of the 1970s is more optimal than the approach
prevailing in the 1980s, there is little reason for a return to that era. The
major change to private securities litigation in the 1970s was the Court’s
386. While class action reform lies beyond the scope of this Article, the class action is a
critical part of the deterrence that this Article argues has been sorely missing from financial
markets. As Professor Coffee has highlighted, some securities class actions may produce wealth
transfers among shareholders that serve neither to compensate nor to deter. Coffee, supra note
185, at 1535–36. Professor Coffee concludes, however, that the correct response to the
shortcomings of the securities class action is to address those problems, not the underlying
substantive law of securities fraud. Id. at 1534–39. He argues persuasively that the best way to
assure deterrence is to force liability upon those most culpable—the senior officers of the public
firm. For example, judges could simply approve higher fee recoveries for plaintiffs’ counsel that
secures significant recoveries from culpable parties or applying proportionate liability when
assessing the fairness of settlements. Id. at 1572–82.
387. See supra note 386.
388. See supra notes 128–34.
389. See supra notes 173–77.
390. Professor Coffee has articulated the economic stakes well:
The deeper problem in securities fraud is the impact of fraud on investor confidence
and thus the cost of equity capital. Here, it is impossible to quantify the impact of any
individual scandal, but clearly the cumulative impact of Enron, WorldCom, and a host
of other scandals in the 2000 to 2002 era made stockholders wary, chilled the initial
public offering market, and caused investors to demand a higher return based on the
perceived higher risks—in short, the cost of capital rose. When the cost of capital
rises, the economy as a whole suffers, as Gross National Product declines or stagnates,
and unemployment may increase. As a result, not only investors, but also citizens
throughout society experience a loss.
Coffee, supra note 185, at 1565. Professor Coffee wrote in 2006, before the concept of an
outright financial panic appeared likely. Unfortunately, the Great Financial Crisis of 2008
demonstrates that investor confidence can be so damaged that an outright financial panic may
occur with all the adverse macroeconomic consequences.
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ruling in Ernst and Ernst v. Hochfelder.391 The Court held in 1976 that
while Rule 10b-5 is a catch-all, what it catches must be fraud—meaning
that the defendant must act with an intent to defraud or scienter.392 It is
difficult if not impossible to attribute the scandals of the twenty-first
century to an opinion from 1976.393 Consequently, it is difficult to
argue that after Ernst & Ernst the law failed to appropriately deter
securities fraud.
Investor protection will lead to superior outcomes, because if
investors are confident that their reasonable expectations will be secured
by law, they will invest at a lower cost to entrepreneurs.394 Thus,
investor protection is associated with higher economic growth.395 One
study found that companies with superior corporate governance
measures enjoyed superior stock market valuations.396
This is
consistent with other studies linking various indices of shareholder
rights to financial performance.397 Weak investor protection leads to a
391. 425 U.S. 185 (1976); see also Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479–80
(1977) (holding that mere breaches of fiduciary duties are not actionable under Rule 10b-5); Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731–55 (1975) (holding that only securities
purchasers or sellers have standing under Rule 10b-5).
392. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193.
393. Nevertheless, as the dissent noted, the outcome seems at odds with: (1) the plain meaning
of the Exchange Act; (2) the plain meaning of Rule 10b-5; (3) the intent of drafters of the Act;
and, (4) the intent of the SEC, the agency that drafted Rule10b-5. Id. at 215–217 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
394.
When their rights are better protected by the law, outside investors are willing to pay
more for financial assets such as equity and debt. They pay more because they
recognize that, with better legal protection, more of the firm’s profits will come back to
them as interest or dividends as opposed to being expropriated by the entrepreneur who
controls the firm. By limiting the expropriation, the law raises the price that securities
fetch in the marketplace. In turn, this enables more entrepreneurs to finance their
investments externally, leading to the expansion of financial markets.
Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, 57 J. FIN. 1147, 1147–51
(2002). These authors further suggest that strong protections for investors of financial products
can lead to higher rates of return. Id.; see also supra note 58. Financial market development is
key to economic growth. See supra notes 56, 57.
395. Rui Castro, Gian Luca Clementi & Glenn MacDonald, Investor Protection, Optimal
Incentives, and Economic Growth, 119 Q. J. ECON. 1131, 1133 (2004) (“[W]e employ standard
techniques from the empirical growth literature to investigate the nature of the relation between
investor protection and growth. Consistent with earlier studies we find a positive association.”).
396. E.g., Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andre Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity
Prices, 118 Q. J. ECON. 107, 108–109 (2003).
397. For example, the index used in the Gompers study has been refined into an apparently
more powerful entrenchment index. See Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What
Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783, 823–24 (2009) (finding that
staggered boards, supermajority voting requirements, poison pills, golden parachute provisions,
and limits on shareholder voting power accounted for most of the drag on financial performance
attributable to weak corporate governance).

RAMIREZ.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

730

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

4/1/2014 10:47 PM

[Vol. 45

shift in the corporate balance of power in favor of management which
will increase self-dealing and lead to higher compensation for
executives.398 If executive compensation is the “canary in the coal
mine” signaling pervasively weak corporate governance, then there is
cause for serious concern in the U.S., where CEO compensation relative
to earnings has doubled over the past ten years.399 In the long run,
securing the reasonable expectations of investors through legal
protection serves the economy, in general, and entrepreneurs in
particular, while also operating to limit agency costs.
Investor protection entails mandatory disclosure of material
information to the investing public—such as that required under the
federal securities laws in the U.S.400 To the extent investors have
access to reliable investment information, they should theoretically be
more willing to invest, meaning entrepreneurs and businesses will enjoy
a lower cost of capital.401 While one may expect private contracts to be
the most effective way to assure an efficient means of securing
appropriate information flows, in fact, such contracting appears
prohibitively costly.402 Beyond that, management is likely to be more
focused on shareholder wealth maximization if they are required to
disclose financial information periodically. 403 Empirical evidence now
supports these theoretical conclusions.
Specifically, Professors
Greenstone, Oyer and Vissing-Jorgensen (“GOV-J”) found that when
the applicability of the federal mandatory disclosure regime was
extended to firms traded in over-the-counter markets in 1964, those
firms enjoyed excess returns and gains in operating performance when
they commenced compliance as well as in the period following the
398. Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton & Ailsa Röell, Corporate Governance and Control, in 1A
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 1, 73–79 (George M. Constantinides, Milton Harris
& René M. Stulz eds., 2003) (stating that corporate governance must stem self-dealing by
managers and that soaring executive compensation in the U.S. is difficult to justify).
399. See Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of U.S. Executive Pay, 21 OXFORD
REV. ECON. POL’Y 283, 284–89 (2005) (finding that the proportion of S&P 500 profits going to
top executive compensation approximately doubled as a percentage of profits from 1993 to 2003).
400. See Michael Greenstone, Paul Oyer & Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, Mandated Disclosure,
Stock Returns, and the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments, 121 Q. J. ECON. 399, 447 (2006)
(“[T]hese results should cause policymakers to question the basis of recent calls to repeal U.S.
federal mandatory disclosure requirements”).
401. Id. at 399–400.
402. Id. at 405.
403. Id. at 406–407 (citing Andrei Schleifer & Daniel Wolfenzon, Investor Protection and
Equity Markets, 66 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 5 (2002)) (articulating a theoretical financial model that
accounts for the following empirical facts associated with better shareholder protection: that it
yields larger firms that are more valuable and plentiful; that it lowers the diversion of profits and
raises dividends; and, that it yields a lower concentration of ownership and more developed
financial markets).
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relevant legislative proposals.404 “Overall, the results suggest that the
benefits of the 1964 Amendments substantially outweigh the costs of
complying with this law as measured by stock returns.”405 In addition,
the GOV-J study concludes that the 1964 Amendments had a positive
impact on operating performance “consistent with the hypothesis that
mandatory disclosure laws can cause managers to focus more narrowly
on the maximization of shareholder value.”406
Given that investor protection is essential to securing the appropriate
economic and financial operation of the public corporation, it would be
natural to consider private enforcement and private rights of action as
necessary components of an appropriate investor protection regime.407
In fact, empirical evidence now demonstrates that “standards of liability
facilitating investor recovery of losses are associated with larger stock
markets.”408
This conclusion is supported by a transnational
comparison of forty-nine nations in terms of financial development and
strength of investor remedies, compiled with the input of attorneys from

404. Id. at 446–447. Previous studies had reached divergent conclusions regarding the
efficacy of the federal mandatory disclosure regime. Compare George J. Stigler, Public
Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. BUS. 117, 124 (1964) (“[S]tudies suggest that the
[SEC] registration requirements had no important effect on the quality of new securities sold to
the public.”), with Irwin Friend & Edward S. Herman, The SEC Through a Glass Darkly, 37 J.
BUS. 382, 389 (1964) (“We doubt that any person reasonably well acquainted with the evolution
of stock-market practices between the pre- and post-SEC periods could lament or underrate the
success of the new legislation in eradicating many of [the] weaknesses in our capital markets.”).
These studies suffered from an inability to isolate the impact of the federal securities laws from
exogenous events that impacted stock prices generally. GOV-J are able to avoid these problems
by using the extension of the federal securities laws pursuant to the 1964 Securities Act
Amendments to compare the performance of affected firms against firms listed on the major stock
exchanges already covered by federal mandatory disclosure requirements. Greenstone et al.,
supra note 400, at 401.
405. Id. at 403.
406. Id. at 447.
407. Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform, supra note 11, at 1082–83. Finance professors state
the justification for broader investor remedies as based upon efficiency considerations (which
suggest the issuer is the lowest cost provider of information) and the need to create adequate
incentives for the disclosure of information. E.g., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes &
Andrei Shleifer, What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. FIN. 1, 5 (2006).
408. Id. at 28. More specifically:
The results on liability standards are also consistently strong. The estimated
coefficients predict that a two-standard deviation increase in this variable (roughly the
distance from Denmark to the U.S.) is associated with an increase of 0.23 percentage
points in the external-market-to-GDP ratio, a 28% rise in listed firms per capita, a 1.88
increase in the IPO-to-GDP ratio, a 6.6 percentage point drop in the block premium, a
0.75 point improvement in the access-to-equity index, a decrease of 6.6 percentage
point drop in ownership concentration (but with a t-stat of only 1.58), and a 45.8 points
increase in the volume-to-GDP ratio.
Id. at 19.
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around the world.409 The authors compared liability standards by
focusing on the degree of culpability of the defendant—ranging from
fraud to strict liability as a means of assessing strength of investor
rights.410 Importantly, this study regarding the appropriate role of
private securities enforcement tracks the outcome of a parallel study of
private remedies for self-dealing under corporate law: “the results [of
this study] suggest that giving aggrieved shareholders the standing to
sue, access to information to identify self-dealing, and a low burden of
proof would deter self-dealing and promote stock market
development.”411 Thus, it appears that facilitating private rights of
action in favor of investors is a key element of sound investor
protection.412 Of course, these findings should not lead policymakers to
withhold adequate resources for public enforcement mechanisms;
instead, public and private enforcement may be the optimal tandem for
enforcement of the securities laws.413
Too often the virtues of private securities litigation get lost in the
cross-fire over the pros and cons of class actions.414 This now seems
inappropriate and even anachronistic.415 First, very few commentators,
409. Id. at 5.
410. Id. at 7.
411. Simeon Djankov et al., The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 430,
463 (2006), available at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/working_
papers/SelfDeal_April13.pdf.
412. The Djankov study, id., was undertaken by a team that included many of the authors of
the study assessing private securities enforcement, see La Porta et al., supra note 407, as well as
many of the other studies associating investor protections with superior financial and economic
outcomes, see supra note 404. As such they addressed the multicollinearity challenges posed by
using different indices to determine stock market development. They concluded that “both
disclosure and the power to enforce contracts through private litigation” appeared “important.”
Djankov et al., supra note 411, at 434.
413. See Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public and Private Enforcement of Securities
Laws: Resource-Based Evidence, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 207, 237 (2009) (finding that “[p]ublic
enforcement . . . correlated significantly with key financial outcomes, such as stock market
capitalization, trading volumes, the number of domestic firms, and the number of IPOs” and that
“public enforcement typically does no worse than disclosure-based private enforcement (and
much better than liability-based private enforcement) in explaining these financial outcomes
around the world”).
414. For example, no one disputes that when wrongdoers pay damages pursuant to a class
action, deterrence is enhanced. See Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation,
Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 49 (1975) (“The availability of the
class action, by permitting the cumulation of individual damages into a sizable sum, may
strengthen the deterrent effect of the substantive rule.”).
415. See, e.g., Hal S. Scott & Leslie N. Silverman, Stockholder Adoption of Mandatory
Individual Arbitration for Stockholder Disputes, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1187, 1226 (2013)
(arguing in favor of an arbitration regime for securities claims due to the uncertain benefits of
securities class actions). I argued in favor of arbitration for securities claims in 1999 in order to
provide a rapid adjudication of meritorious claims and rapid termination of frivolous claims.
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if any, seek to reverse the class action reforms of the PSLRA.416
Second, the costs of promiscuous securities laws now dwarf the
negligible inconvenience imposed upon securities fraudfeasors.417
Third, regardless of the shortcomings of private securities litigation in
the context of a class action, much of the focus in this Article on the war
on securities litigation has nothing to do with class actions at all.418
Fourth, restricting substantive rights due to flaws inherent in class
actions completely discounts the costs arising from compromised
deterrence.419 Thus, the class action debate must not obscure the need
to deter securities fraud. Regardless of the inconvenience or nuisance
that powerful firms and their managers must endure as a result of their
securities fraud, the substantive law of securities fraud must operate to
secure investor confidence and financial stability. 420 Otherwise, the
costs of tolerating excessive securities fraud are apt to be cast in
trillions.421
Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform, supra note 11, at 1140–41. Professors Scott and Silverman
argue that the costs of class actions exceed the benefits without a consideration of
macroeconomic considerations or financial stability. Scott & Silverman, supra, at 1192–1202. In
principle, arbitration could well operate to secure deterrence and enhance compensation,
particularly if the SEC promulgated rules expanding discovery rights, simplifying pleading
requirements, restoring secondary liability, imposing an expanded statute of limitations and
permitting recovery for less than fraud. In other words, there is no reason why the rollback
argued for herein could not be implemented through an SEC authorized arbitration procedure.
See Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform, supra note 11, at 1134–40 (suggesting several methods of
implementation of an ADR regime).
416. Id. at 1093.
417. Of course it is not possible to define with any precision the actual historic costs of
massive securities fraud. This Article has highlighted the securities fraud and skullduggery in
connection with the last two catastrophic financial collapses—The Great Depression and The
Great Financial Crisis of 2008. See supra Parts I, II. If securities fraud holds even a 10%
causation in such events then the costs of allowing law to be prostituted to elite interests in this
area is many trillions of dollars. See supra notes 340–45.
418. “[E]ven if there is a problem with abusive class actions, the PSLRA is hopelessly
overbroad and does not really address how to stem such abuses.” Ramirez, Arbitration and
Reform, supra note 11, at 1093.
419. Notably, Professors Scott and Silverman include as a cost the $68.1 billion paid to settle
allegations of securities fraud from 2000 to 2012, as well as the costs of defense. Scott &
Silverman, supra note 415, at 1202. This a relatively trifling amount relative to the
macroeconomic harm imposed upon the entire economy when securities fraud becomes pervasive
in financial markets. But, fundamentally, the amount paid by a fraudfeasor to compensate a
victim is not a cost—it is beneficial deterrence. Fraudfeasors enjoy no economically rational
basis for retaining their ill-gotten gains.
420. There is a wealth of data suggesting that our financial system is burdened with too much
fraud since the PSLRA, even beyond the massive securities frauds discussed above. Thus, for
example, between 1997 and 2002, accounting restatements soared from 92 to 250. U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-138, FINANCIAL STATEMENT RESTATEMENTS: TRENDS,
MARKET IMPACTS, REGULATORY RESPONSES AND REMAINING CHALLENGES 15 (2002).
421. Admittedly, it is impossible to disentangle the impact of declining financial institution
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As Professor Kindleberger demonstrated, fraud and financial crises
closely follow each other. Crashes and panics often are triggered by
revelations of malfeasance.422 Swindles arise from greed that is fed by
the mania of a boom.423 Investors seeking high returns abound in a
boom and become easy prey for fraudfeasors.424 At the end of the
boom, insiders try to grab as much as they can before the coming
collapse arrives.425 Once the fraudulent foundation of the mania
becomes manifest, capital runs for cover and safety with such rapidity
and in such volume that the general economy suffers a credit shock and
contracts as liquidity disappears from the system and cash hoarding sets
in.426 The frauds amplify the booms and exacerbate the busts.427

fraud prosecutions and criminal prosecutions of securities fraud from a more promiscuous
approach to private securities litigation. See supra note 363 and accompanying text (showing
decline in criminal actions for financial institution fraud and securities fraud in the years prior to
the Great Financial Crisis of 2008).
422. KINDLEBERGER, supra note 33, at 5, 77. The financial markets reacted violently in midSeptember of 2008 to the news of Lehman’s demise and the AIG bailout. In a classic response to
the disclosure of previously concealed risks, investors rapidly crowded into the safest and least
risky instruments available—short term Treasury obligations. The demand for such instruments
reached such high and unprecedented levels that yields dropped essentially to zero. Deborah
Levine, Treasury’s up after Housing Data Hint at Further Stresses, MARKETWATCH (Sept. 17,
2008), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/treasurys-up-after-housing-data-hint-at-further-stress
es; see also Paul Krugman, Liquidity Trap, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2008, http://krugman.blogs
.nytimes.com/2008/09/17/liquidity-trap/?_r=1. In just four business days, the yield on one-month
Treasury obligations fell from 1.37% to .07%. Daily Treasury Yield Curve Rates, U.S. DEP’T OF
TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates/Pages/TextV
iew.aspx?data=yieldYear&year=2008 (last visited Mar. 10, 2014).
423. KINDLEBERGER, supra note 33, at 5. Recall that in late 2007, AIG told investors that the
economic risk of their derivatives portfolio was “close to zero.” FCIC REPORT, supra note 114,
at 272. These statements were belied when it became apparent to the market that AIG needed a
bailout to meet its commitment under its derivatives agreements. On September 15, 2008, AIG’s
stock plunged 61% on revelations regarding its true derivatives exposure. Paul Vigna, This Day
in Crisis History: Sept. 15-16, 2008, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2013, http://blogs.
wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/09/16/this-day-in-crisis-history-sept-15-16-2008/. The entire stock
market adjusted that day to new, undisclosed risks, as the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 504
points. Id.
424. KINDLEBERGER, supra note 33, at 73, 76. Among the carnage of the Great Financial
Crisis of 2008, lies the town of Narvik, Norway. The town invested money it borrowed upon the
security of its power plant to “invest” in complex mortgage-backed securities peddled by
Citigroup. The town lost big and ultimately sued Citigroup. Mark Landler, U.S. Credit Crisis
Adds to Gloom in Norway, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/12/02/world/europe/02norway.html?_r=1&hp&oref=slogin.
425. KINDLEBERGER, supra note 33, at 5. Thus, Angelo Mozilo of Countrywide sold massive
shares of Countrywide through mid-2007, right before the firm sustained massive losses from
subprime lending.
426. Id. at 90.
427. Kedia & Phillipon, supra note 217, at 2196–97 (explaining that firms engaged in
fraudulent accounting invest and hire excessively to portray success, and shed workers and capital
once fraud is detected).

RAMIREZ.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

The Virtues of Private Securities Litigation

4/1/2014 10:47 PM

735

Experience proves Kindleberger’s central insights on the relationship
between massive fraud and capital fight.
It is impossible to rank frauds in any objective way and the
unavailability of data may in any event render such rankings impossible.
Nevertheless, the Great Financial Crisis of 2008 involved massive
securities fraud in connection with the marketing and sale of mortgagebacked securities as well as shares in public firms. We will never know
how much capital would have been diverted from the housing boom
during the critical years of 2004–2007 if the truth had been conveyed to
the investing public about the subprime exposure of firms like AIG,
Lehman Brothers, Countrywide and Citigroup. Nor will we ever know
how many mortgages would not have been capitalized if the true risks
of mortgage pools had been disclosed by the investors in such pools by
firms such as Chase or Goldman Sachs. Finally, we cannot know if
these capital flows, based upon materially misleading statements to the
investing public, would have been reduced in the absence of the war on
private securities litigation. Still, the economic fallout and sheer
quantity of securities tainted by fraud at the heart of the crisis suggests
that the Great Financial Crisis of 2008 may qualify as the greatest
financial fraud ever experienced in the U.S.—rivaling even the massive
securities frauds underlying the Great Depression.428
The experience of 2008 teaches much, particularly in conjunction
with the fundamental lessons taught by the experience of the Great
Depression.429 Both episodes occurred during a period of time when
investors held only narrow or restricted rights and remedies against
securities peddlers and their associated professionals. 430 Both episodes
reveal that corporate and financial elites concluded that they could walk
off with huge wealth from massive and heinous frauds with limited
accountability.431 In short, the experience of 2008 as well as the Great
428. Observers of the years before the Great Depression called that period “the greatest era of
crooked high finance the world has ever known.” KINDLEBERGER, supra note 33, at 84.
429. The similarities between the wrongdoing underlying the Great Financial Crisis of 2008
and the Great Depression are striking. Both involved all of the most respected financial
institutions and leaders in the nation. Further, both involved almost incomprehensible levels of
culpability. Compare supra notes 51–55, with supra notes 260–78, 309–13.
430. In the Great Depression future Defense Secretary James Forrestal infamously engaged in
a high-profit trading scheme involving legal machinations that limited his tax liability. When
discovered, he paid additional taxes out of a sense of “moral obligation.” 3 MORISON, supra note
41, at 283–84. He never repaid the investors who lost money as a result of his trading. Id. Like
modern day Angelo Mozilo, he kept the great weight of the ill-gotten gains. See Hamilton &
Reckard, supra note 269.
431. The FCIC found that Wall Street bankers used a specific term to describe their insulation
from accountability. The term is: “IBGYBG.” It means “I’ll be gone, you’ll be gone.” FCIC
REPORT, supra note 114, at 8.
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Depression teaches that unconstrained elites will perpetrate frauds for
profit in the securities markets to the great expense of investors and the
macroeconomy.432 In both experiences the law failed to productively
curb and channel the economic power exercised by corporate and
financial elites.
The life of the law is experience not logic.433 As John Dickinson
stated to the Constitutional Convention of 1787: “Experience must be
our only guide. Reason may mislead us.”434 With respect to securities
litigation this means that historic experience and empirical reality must
trump theorizing or worse, anecdotes.435 The experience of 2008
speaks loudly regarding the utter failure of the war on securities
litigation.436 This Article demonstrates based upon that experience that
more robust enforcement of proscriptions against securities fraud must
operate to help prevent and mitigate macroeconomic pain arising from
severe financial crises. Deterrence should trump petty concerns about
phantom extortionate settlements, nearly invisible frivolous claims and
inconvenience to entrenched corporate and financial elites.
CONCLUSION
This Article argues for true securities litigation reform based upon the
history of the U.S. financial markets and economic studies of what
works in securities regulation—that is, based upon experience. It seeks
to set the record straight from that perspective regarding the costs of the
war on securities litigation. It includes an historical look at the
configuration of the law when appropriate deterrence suppressed
securities fraud for a period of six decades. It views the very concept of
reform as likely to function appropriately in a macroeconomic sense

432. See supra Part II.
433. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (Dover Publications, Inc. 1991)
(1881).
434. 2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 278 (rev.
ed. 1966). Dickinson’s observation regarding the hazards of theorizing preceded Holmes’
observation by over 100 years. In any event, the concept that law must permit empirical reality
and experience to trump logic, reason and theory alone enjoys deep roots in American law and
broad support among those involved in drafting the Constitution. Albert W. Alschuler, From
Blackstone to Holmes: The Revolt Against Natural Law, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 491, 495–96 (2009)
(citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, at 72 (James Madison) (Michael Lloyd Chadwick ed., 1987)).
435. See supra notes 36, 353 (describing unsubstantiated perceptions of American litigants).
436. I use the term “failure” in the context of the macroeconomic costs of massive securities
as exemplified in both 2008 and the Great Depression. If the goal was to untether elites from
accountability for securities fraud then the war on securities litigation succeeded in returning to a
pre-Depression regime of limited accountability. The best demonstration of this is the eerie
similarity of the frauds underlying both macroeconomic catastrophes. See generally Carbone,
supra note 30 (revisiting the role of the Pecora hearings).
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only when those holding concentrated economic power must face a
legal system, not beholden to those interests, that cabins power
productively. The story of the history of securities law in the U.S.
evinces a powerful lesson—when judicial and legislative outcomes
follow too tightly the parochial interests of powerful business leaders, it
costs all of society dearly.
This narrative holds that in an era of high inequality, the subversion
of the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws seems
inevitable. If the most powerful within our society wished to free
themselves from legal restraints, a logical place to start would be the
federal securities laws and their robust private remedies that existed
prior to the 1990s. The definition of a security is sufficiently broad that
virtually all financial and business endeavors that can support maximum
wealth transfers must travel through the securities markets. This is why
the broad remedies enacted during the New Deal successfully
eliminated macroeconomically significant bouts of securities fraud.
From Ken Lay at Enron to options backdating to the Magnetar Trade
and the insider trading scandals of Countrywide, securities fraud
constitutes an easy road to windfall compensation and profits. The war
on private securities litigation imposed costs on the American economy
beginning in 2001 and culminating in the subprime debacle. Even more
recently, securities fraud thrives in America, not just as an occasional
nuisance as it was for over six decades but as a constant threat to the
American economy as a whole. This is the predictable multi-trillion
dollar cost of ignoring the virtues of private securities litigation. Law
must revert to the approach that secured deterrence for decades: private
securities litigation should operate robustly to punish securities
fraudfeasors and compensate victims.
In the final analysis coddling securities fraudfeasors is a bad idea.
Capitalism requires free-flowing, if not perfect, information. Capital
can only be allocated well in accordance with sound information.
Beyond efficiency concerns lies macroeconomic realities: fraudulent
information fuels booms and busts, and busts too often lead to massive
macroeconomic costs in the form of recessions or worse. These multitrillion dollar catastrophes impose costs that dwarf the petty even venal
concerns of the so-called reformers who seek to reverse laws associated
with prosperity to entrench small bands of growth-retarding elites.
Robust private enforcement of the federal securities laws should operate
as a fundamental element of sound legal infrastructure.

